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COlMENT
What a Difference ADEA Makes:' Why Disparate Impact
Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act
Imagine you are a business owner in the 1990s. In these difficult
economic times you may need to "readjust" your company's
workforce in order to keep your business profitable. An effective
strategy might be to replace your most expensive employees-those
with the highest salaries, largest fringe benefit expenses or highest
pension benefit costs-with employees who will cost less to do the
same jobs.2 However, you recognize that such a decision is likely to
effect your older workers more than your younger employees, because
older workers are likely to have the higher salaries associated'with
greater experience and seniority, and because these salaries, combined
with health and lifestyle differences, make them more expensive to
employ.3 You may not have any motivation to harm older workers;
in fact, you may even have a proud track record of complying with all
state and federal employment laws and have no intention of
discriminating against older workers.4 But with a changing economy
1. Credit for this title is due to John F. Cannon, who used this phrase to title the
conclusion section of his article, Statistical Analysis in ADEA Litigation, in AGE
DISCRIMINATION WORKSHOP 1985: STATE AND FEDERAL LmGATION 543, 572 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 287, 1985).
2. This decision is being made daily in businesses across the country. See, e.g., Liz
Spayd, As Recession Forces Layoffs, Older Workers Feel Targeted, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
1992, at Cl ("Companies are desperate to thin the ranks. ... Faced with the choice of
letting go an eager, young upstart making $30,000 a year, or a worker twice as old and
earning twice as much, companies are tempted to hand the older worker the pink slip.").
3. As one commentator explained this situation:
Seniority and longevity often influence salary and fringe benefit levels. Because
these factors correlate with age, older workers can become more costly to
compensate than their younger counterparts. This disparity creates significant
tension during times of economic stress when employers look to maximize savings
by laying off or replacing their costliest workers. The tension exists because the
use of salary costs as a criterion for layoffs appears to be both economically
rational yet peculiarly burdensome to the older segment of the workforce.
Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42- FLA. L. REv. 229, 232 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
4. "Most companies [which are sued for age discrimination after firing numerous
older workers] say their intent is not to remove older workers, but to cut costs, and they
note that many younger workers also are laid off as they trim their workforces." Spayd,
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and a difficult and competitive business environment, your business
needs to have the best, most cost-efficient workforce possible.
Now imagine that instead of being a business owner, you are an
employee over the age of forty.' You are probably acutely aware of
the many stereotypes that exist about older workers. Older people
are often perceived as "not very physically active, not very good at
getting things done, not very useful members of their community, not
very open-minded and adaptable."6 You may have seen or heard
that employers tend to avoid hiring or promoting older workers
because of false perceptions that older workers are slower, less
creative and less energetic than younger workers;7 that they are
untrainable, less productive, and less adaptable workers; that they are
likely to miss more work and to be depressed. Employers may even
be "more critical of their older workers' performance, more skeptical
of their ability to keep pace with technological developments and
more concerned with the cost of their insurance and retirement
benefits."9  In essence, as an "older" worker, you may feel that
employers will look at your chronological age and not your
abilities-just as many employers once looked at skin color or gender
rather than capability-and you may watch as younger people are
preferred while older people are often excluded. ° If you are an
supra note 2, at C4.
5. For the purposes of this Comment, the age of forty will be considered the point
at which a person is "older" because the Age Discrimination in Employment Act has set
"40 years of age" as the minimum qualifying age for statutory protection. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1993).
6. JACK LEVIN & WILLIAM C. LEVIN, AGEISM: PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST THE ELDERLY 74 (1980).
7. Linda Grant, Fired at Fifty: Older Workers Feeling the Sting of Recession, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at Dl.
8. See Michelle Hiskey, Fired Older Workers Winning Court Cases Over Firms' Age
Bias, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 27, 1989, at Al.
9. Larry Lipman, Big Companies More Likely to View Older Workers as Bottom-Line
Drag, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 30, 1989, at A5.
10. Marla Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1062-65 (1984). Despite the fact that the
percentage of older Americans within the total population continues to increase, their role
in the workforce and the portion of overall economic benefits that they receive continues
to decline. Id.
It is frequently argued that much of corporate America does not show the same
sensitivity to age that it does to race and gender. Often, business executives brag about
having young staffs or management teams. This is clearly illustrated in the following
account:
Lawyers for John Sheahan, a longtime CBS News Television correspondent
dismissed at age 53 in a round of layoffs at the network, in his [age
discrimination] suit presented evidence from a meeting of CBS news interns and
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employee with a high salary, pension, and healthcare costs who is
affected by an employer's re-adjustment of its workforce, you may
very likely feel you have been unfairly victimized due to these
stereotypes.
In either situation, whether you are the employer or employee,
you may contact a lawyer or government Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission official to find out if it is legal for an
employer to make employment decisions on the basis of the salaries,
pension status, or other age-related costs of employees." The issue
that the employer and employee are both raising is a fundamental
question in employment discrimination law: whether disparate impact
theory-which allows a complainant to challenge a facially neutral
employment policy or practice by showing that the policy or practice
impacts more harshly on a protected class of individuals than on
others--is a valid theory of recovery under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).Y This issue has never been decided by
the United States Supreme Court, 4 has been the subject of much
conflict within the federal court system," and has been argued
forcefully on both sides by academics and scholars. 6 Despite a
network executives. At the session, a young journalism student wondered aloud,
"Where are all the old people at CBS?"
"We put them in radio," responded a CBS News Vice President, a comment
that sent the entire room into laughter.... None of the jurors laughed, however,
and before Sheahan's case went to the jury, CBS settled for an undisclosed sum.
Mike Doming, Fired Older Workers Sue on Bias, and Win, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1994, § 1,
at 1, 10.
11. Lawyers who represent employers in employment discrimination cases must wish
that their clients would ask them about the legality of an employment decision before the
employer carries out the decision. This would enable the lawyer to advise the employer
about what types of employment decisions are legal and what types of actions are
prohibited, so that problems and lawsuits could be avoided.
12. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977).
Disparate impact doctrine was originally created by the United States Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a Title VII employment discrimination
case, in an effort to ensure that the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was followed.
The Griggs doctrine allows employees who are discriminated against on the basis of their
race to recover against their employers even when they cannot prove that their employer
possessed a discriminatory intent. For a complete discussion of the Griggs decision and
the creation of disparate impact theory, see infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993) ("[W]e have never
decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA. .. ").
See infra note 120 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Supreme Court's
failure to directly address the applicability of disparate impact theory to the ADEA.
15. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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debate that has been ongoing for more than a decade, "there [is still]
no clear dividing line between when the company's right [to make an
employment decision] for economic reasons intrudes on the worker's
right not to be discriminated against because of age."' 7  This
question of whether disparate impact should apply to the ADEA
remains unresolved.
At the same time, this issue seems destined to become only more
pervasive in employment discrimination claims. As the "graying" of
the "Baby Boom" generation 8 combines with corporate America's
continuing emphasis on reducing payrolls and shrinking workforces,
it seems inevitable that employment decisions will be made that will
adversely impact older Americans. This trend makes the issue of
whether disparate impact liability should be available under the
ADEA very timely and important to the area of employment law and
the emerging field of elder law.' 9
This Comment argues that disparate impact theory developed for
Title VII litigation should not be applied to the ADEA because of
important differences between the statutory language, legislative
17. Louise Witt, Middle-Age Squeeze: More Workers Are Going to Court with the
Charge that Age Cost Them Professionally, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 31, 1994, at 8F, 9F
("From one federal district or appellate court to another, decisions have been wildly
erratic. It's never been completely and satisfactorily solved.").
18. See generally HAROLD L. SHEPPARD & SARA E. RIX, THE GRAYING OF
WORKING AMERICA (1977) (describing the "Baby Boom" generation as "graying").
19. "Age [discrimination] charges are growing at a faster rate than race, sex or
national origin [discrimination] cases." Kenneth J. Cooper, Out of a Job: A Matter of
Age, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 21, 1987, at 1F (quoting Paul Brenner, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) staff attorney). This trend can be seen
in the number of charges of age discrimination filed with the EEOC since 1980. In fiscal
year 1980, there were 11,076 ADEA charges filed, accounting for 18.6% of all EEOC
charges filed. In fiscal year 1986, the number of ADEA charges filed had risen to 17,443,
which made up 25.3% of all EEOC charges. By fiscal year 1992, the number of ADEA
charges filed amounted to 19,253, or 27.4% of all EEOC charges. 1 HOWARD C. EGLIT,
AGE DISCRIMINATION § 2.01, at 2-6 (2d ed. 1994).
While this is occurring, the number of people protected by the ADEA continues to
grow. The ADEA covered only 56 million people between the ages of 40 and 65 in 1980
versus an estimated 90 million, or 37% of the population, who were over the age of 40 in
1987. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1994, at 14 (114th ed. 1994). As the baby boom generation ages and the average life
expectancy increases, the number of people covered by the ADEA will only continue to
grow. See 1 EGLIT, supra, § 1.04 at 1-1 to 1-16. By 2004, more than half of the workforce
will be in the protected age group. Doming, supra note 10, § 1, at 1; see also Ronald E.
Roel, Older Workers Face Age-Old Problem: Despite Labor Shortage, Many Still Feel
Impact of Stereotypes, NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 1989, available in WESTLAW, NWSDAY
database, at WL2 (discussing the impact of an aging population and the increasing life
expectancy on the labor market).
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history, and policies. of the ADEA and Title VII. The Comment
offers a comprehensive review of how this issue developed and why
it still remains unclear, leaving employers, their employees, and all
older Americans without proper guidance in this area. This Comment
concludes that the issue should be resolved against the use of
disparate impact theory in ADEA litigation.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the ADEA,
including a review of the ADEA's goals and the statutory defenses
available to employers under the statute."° Part II examines disparate
impact theory, including the development and extension of disparate
impact doctrine over the last twenty years.2 ' After reviewing the
theory of disparate impact and the ADEA itself Part III then
describes why the decision to apply or not to apply disparate impact
theory to the ADEA is of such importance.' With the critical nature
of this decision properly in focus, Part IV then offers a combined
analysis of disparate impact theory and the ADEA, and illustrates
why the theory should not be applied to the ADEA z This Part
includes a review of the ADEA's language, its statutory history, and
the policy goals that supported the statute's enactment, and shows the
inherent conflict between disparate impact theory and the ADEA.
Finally, Part V offers an assessment of the drastic effect disparate
impact theory would have on the ADEA and the areas of age
discrimination and employment litigation, and concludes that any
attempt to address the adverse effects an employment decision may
have on older workers should be carried out by Congress, and not the
judiciary.24
I. OVERVIEW OF THE AGE DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
Acr OF 1967
A. Purposes of the ADEA
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967' was
enacted by Congress with a three-part purpose: "[T]o promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
20. See infra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 53-107 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 126-304 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 305-25 and accompanying text.
25. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment." 6  Under the ADEA, it is
prohibited for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age."' 7 Specifically, the
ADEA attempts to protect Americans age forty and older from age
discrimination in the workplace.2 The central theme of the ADEA
is "to shift [the] focus away from chronological age and age-related
barriers,"' 9 thereby generally prohibiting employers from "using age
as a factor in employment decisions or from classifying employees in
ways that would adversely affect employment opportunities because
of age."
30
It is critical to an understanding of the ADEA to review the
congressional statement of findings and purpose in ADEA section
two." This section notes the negative effects of arbitrary age
discrimination, 2 and recognizes that such discrimination is occurring
with increased frequency and greater harm to older persons.3 But,
despite the appearance that the ADEA provides broad protection for
older workers against employment discrimination, the findings in
26. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
27. Id. § 623(a)(1).
28. See iL § 631(a). The pertinent language of § 631(a) states: "The prohibitions of
this chapter ... shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." ld. The
original version of the statute only protected workers between the ages of 40 and 65, but
the ADEA was subsequently amended, first increasing the upper age limit to 70, Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92
Stat. 189, 189-90 (1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1993)), and then
removing the upper age limit entirely, Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(g)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
29. Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 235.
30. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1038 (footnote omitted).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
32. See id. § 621(a)(1) ("[O]Ider workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts
to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs
... ."); id. § 621(a)(2) ("[Tihe setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may
work to the disadvantage of older persons . . . ."); id. § 621(a)(3) ("[T]he incidence of
unemployment ... is, relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their
numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems grave ....").
33. See id § 621(a)(2) ("[T]he setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for
job performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices
may work to the disadvantage of older persons ....").
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section two underscore that Congress' goal in enacting the ADEA
was not to prohibit all consideration of age and age-related criteria;
rather, the ADEA outlaws only arbitrary discrimination 4 For
example, several parts of the statute legitimize the consideration of
age in some contexts?' Moreover, the ADEA did not aspire to end
the practice of arbitrary age discrimination merely by the prohibitions
found in the statute. The purpose of the legislation was to "promote
the employment of older workers based on their ability... through
an education and information program to assist employers and
employees in meeting employment problems which are real and
dispelling those which are illusory .... "" Finally, along with its
prohibitions, the ADEA was also directed "to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment."38
34. The concept of arbitrariness is referred to no less than three times in the ADEA's
statement of findings and purposes. See ADEA § 2(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (1988)
("[T]he setting of arbitrary age limits ... has become a common practice, and ... may
work to the disadvantage of older persons.... ."); ADEA § 2(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4)
(1988) ("[Tjhe existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in
employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce
.... "); ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988) ("It is therefore the purpose of this
chapter to... prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment .... ").
35. For a discussion of the ADEA's statutory defenses, see infra notes 39-52 and
accompanying text.
36. President Johnson, in his Special Message to Congress recommending passage of
the ADEA, recognized the limits on the ability of any statute to eradicate completely the
effects of age discrimination in employment: "Employment opportunities for older
workers cannot be increased solely by measures eliminating discrimination." President's
Special Message to Congress Proposing Programs for Older Americans, PUB. PAPERS 32,
37 (Jan. 23, 1967). There is a distinct difference between decisions made "on the basis of
age" and "arbitrary age discrimination." Decisions made on the basis of age means that
the employer considers the age of an employee (or employees) when it makes employment
decisions because the characteristic of age is actually relevant to the choice being made,
and thus needs to be taken into account by the decision-maker. In contrast, arbitrary age
discrimination means that age is considered despite its total irrelevance to the choice being
made, and therefore, it should not be a factor in the decision-maker's calculus. The
ADEA is concerned with arbitrary age discrimination, as typified by President Johnson's
own message to Congress recommending enactment of the ADEA, "a law prohibiting
arbitrary and unjust discrimination in employment because of a person's age." Id; see also
Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 236 (discussing the congressional intent to prohibit only
arbitrary age discrimination, as evidenced by the statutory exception for justified
differentiation).
37. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967), reprinted
in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214. Congress also recognized that "promotion, education,
and persuasion are [the] most effective" ways to combat age discrimination in employment.
ld. at 3, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2215.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
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B. Statutory Defenses under the ADEA
In creating the ADEA, Congress did not prohibit every use of
age as a factor in making employment policies and decisions. The
ADEA provides for several statutory defenses, which either permit
age discrimination in employment under certain conditions, or allow
the employer to prove that the employment decision was based on
factors other than age. 9
1. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)
An employer does not violate the ADEA by using age as a factor
to make an employment decision if age is a "bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business."'  The BFOQ defense allows discrimination on
the basis of age to occur if the employer can justify the
discrimination.41 The BFOQ defense applies when the employer
adopts a uniform policy of age limitations that are appropriately
linked to job qualifications.42 For example, the refusal to hire any
person over a specific age for a particular job that requires great
physical stamina, such as an airline pilot, may be in the interest of
public safety and therefore be justified as a BFOQ exception to the
ADEA.43
39. In addition to the four statutory defenses discussed infra at notes 40-52 and accom-
panying text, an employer may also avoid liability under the ADEA: (1) by affirmatively
proving that it acted in good faith reliance on a written administrative regulation, order,
ruling, approval, or interpretation, or an administrative practice or enforcement policy, 29
U.S.C. § 259 (1988); id. § 626(e) (Supp. V 1993); (2) if the suit alleging a violation of the
ADEA fails to comply with the required statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)-(e)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); or (3) if the employer who allegedly violates the ADEA is a
foreign person not controlled by an American employer, 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (1988).
40. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
41. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LAW
ISSUES, 1993 EDITION 154 (1993).
42. Id. at 155. This defense allows a business to require that employees be able to
execute certain tasks, usually physical tasks, that are directly relevant to the employee's
job. Some jobs include within their descriptions certain tasks that not all persons may be
able to accomplish, but are central to the job's completion. The employer is not required
to hire an applicant or maintain in its employment an employee who cannot carry out a
task necessary to the job. Id. at 155-56.
43. The Federal Aviation Agency rules that prohibit airline pilots from working as
pilots when they reach the age of 60 have been upheld against numerous challenges. See,
e.g., Gathercole v. Global Assocs., 727 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1087 (1984) (upholding as valid BFOQ federal regulation prohibiting persons aged
60 or older from piloting a commercially operated aircraft).
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2. Bona Fide Seniority Systems and Employee Benefit Plans'
An employer does not violate the ADEA by observing the terms
of a bona fide seniority system or the terms of a qualified benefit
plan, so long as neither was intended to evade the purposes of the
ADEA.4" This defense allows employers to differentiate between
employees based on their years of service and to spend different
amounts on employee benefits without violating the ADEA.46
Similar to the BFOQ defense, this defense allows discrimination on
the basis of age to occur but provides a justification for such
discrimination.47
3. Reasonable Factor Other Than Age ("RFOTA")
Employers may also defend an age discrimination claim on the
rationale that the differentiation complained of was based not on age,
but rather on a reasonable factor other than age.48 This defense
denies that age played a role in the employment decision-instead the
employer claims that it used other valid factors in making the
employment decision. The defense is essentially that the employer
did not need to rely on age in a discriminatory manner, because it had
other valid reasons for making the same decision, and therefore it
cannot be shown to have discriminated on the basis of age.49 The
44. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2287 (1990)), replaced the original
ADEA language regarding bona fide seniority systems and certain qualified employee
benefit plans. The original language of the statute stated that it was not unlawful for an
employer "to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of this chapter." ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1988)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993). Both the original
language and the amended version of this exception to the ADEA reflect Congress'
awareness of a unique problem of age discrimination: pension and insurance programs
rely largely on actuarial age factors. Mandating equal coverage for all workers would be
very expensive for employers, and might lead employers to view older workers as even
more unattractive employees-a result opposite to the goals of the ADEA. This exception
saves employers the cost of paying for equal benefits despite actuarially required costs,
while not affecting the employability of older workers. Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 249-
50.
45. ADEA § 4(f)(2)(A)-(B), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1993).
46. Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 249-50.
47. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 41, at 154.
48. ADEA § 4(0(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988).
49. For a more complete discussion of the effect the RFOTA defense has on the
applicability of disparate impact theory to the ADEA, see infra notes 159-82 and
accompanying text.
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RFOTA defense attempts to show that there was no causal relation-
ship between age and any adverse impact on the defendant's
employee(s)."
4. Good Cause
An employer may discharge or discipline an employee for good
cause,51 and may show that the employment policy or termination
decision was not motivated by age discrimination by pointing to valid
reasons for the decision. Like the RFOTA defense, the use of the
good cause defense requires the employer to demonstrate the lack of
a causal link between age and any adverse impact on the
employee(s).52
The ADEA's statutory defenses provide for some latitude in
employment decisions where age may be a factor in the decisions. As
shown, the BFOQ and the bona fide seniority systems and employee
benefit plans defenses actually allow employers to use age in a
manner that may have a discriminatory effect on older Americans,
while the RFOTA and good cause defenses provide the opportunity
for the employer to show that the employment decision was based on
factors other than age. These statutory defenses are consistent with
the ADEA's goal of prohibiting only arbitrary age discrimination in
employment.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. Definition of Disparate Impact Theory
The theory of disparate impact applies to situations in which a
specific, facially neutral employment policy or practice is challenged
as having a disproportionate impact on a class of workers protected
by statute, where that impact cannot be justified by a legitimate
business consideration.53 The issue is not whether an employer
50. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 41, at 154-55.
51. ADEA § 4(0(3), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1988).
52. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 41, at 154-55.
53. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
"[C]laims that stress 'disparate impact'... involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Id. at 336. Disparate
impact theory is generally considered the "second[ary], alternative theory of [showing
employment] discrimination," Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1431 (D. Wyo.
1994), because disparate treatment theory, in which the focus is on the motive or intent
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intended to discriminate against its employees and applicants, or
whether there existed any motivation to discriminate--motive or
intent is not a concern under disparate impact theory.54 The focus
is solely on the actual effect that the employer's practice or policy had
on the members of the protected class. Disparate impact claims
assess the effects, rather than the intent, of "practices, procedures, or
tests [that are] neutral on their face."'
The essence of a disparate impact claim is that a policy or
practice affects members of the protected category and the rest of the
employer's workforce differently, and that such difference does not
result by chance 6 Generally, disparate impact is proved by showing
that a neutral employment policy or practice creates a significant
statistical disparity between workers within the protected class and
those outside the class5 For example, ideally,58 if older persons
comprise ten percent of the qualified labor force (however "qualified
labor force" may be defined in the specific circumstances), one would
expect the employer's workforce to include about ten percent older
persons 9 The use of statistics enables courts to discover any
difference in employment levels between members of the protected
class and those outside the class.'
In contrast to disparate impact, disparate treatment theory
focuses on whether an employer impermissibly differentiates among
employees or applicants based on a characteristic of a protected
class.61 In a disparate treatment claim, an employee is attempting to
show that the employment policy or practice in question caused the
plaintiff employee to be treated less favorably than others, and to
of the employer, is "the most easily understood type of discrimination," International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. For a more detailed explanation of disparate treatment
theory, see infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
54. "Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate-impact
theory." International Bhd- of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
55. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971).
56. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1070.
57. Disparate impact analysis involves different issues and evidence than disparate
treatment-the former uses statistical theory not to infer the motive of an employer but
rather to describe the result of a policy. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981).
58. That is, absent a decision based on business necessity or a "reasonable factor other
than age" (RFOTA). See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
59. "[A] group of employees should reflect the composition of its appropriate
benchmark, at least in terms of the protected category." Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1069.
60. Id.
61. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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show that the employer had a discriminatory motive.62 A disparate
treatment plaintiff may either show the employer's discriminatory
motive by direct evidence, or may establish a prima facie case by
following the four-step burden of proof standard established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.' In essence, McDonnell
Douglas requires the plaintiff to show a much more stringent set of
circumstances than would be required by a disparate impact plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Under
McDonnell Douglas a plaintiff must establish: (1) her own member-
ship in the protected class; (2) that she applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that she was
rejected despite her qualification; and (4) that after being rejected, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants with the plaintiff's qualifications.' Once the plaintiff makes
this showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show non-
discriminatory reasons for the different treatment. 65
The basic concept of disparate impact theory has been criticized
because of the difficulties of its application and its reliance on
statistics. 66  In the age discrimination setting the problem is even
62. Id.
63. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64. See id. at 802.
65. Id. "[E]very court of appeals has embraced the prima facie case formulation
devised in McDonnell Douglas as being applicable to ADEA based claims." 1 EGLIT,
supra note 19, § 7.03, at 7-17 to 7-18. However, the fourth element is often modified in
cases of age discrimination, especially in discharge or replacement cases. Some courts
require the plaintiff to prove that an applicant hired was outside the protected group. See,
e.g., Olsen v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 480 F. Supp. 773,779 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff d, 654
F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring age discrimination plaintiff to prove that applicant hired
was younger than 40). Courts disagree over the showing required for a plaintiff alleging
she was illegally replaced: Some require a showing that the replacement worker is under
age forty, Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977); some that the
replacement is "substantially" younger, Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir.
1981) or "sufficiently" younger, Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503,1506
(5th Cir. 1988); and some courts allow recovery even if the replacement is older than the
plaintiff, Smith v. World Book-Childcraft, Int'l, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 96, 100-02 (N.D. Ill.
1980). When, however, the employee's claim involves a reduction in force so that the fired
employee is. not replaced, all circuit courts have agreed that the fourth factor must be
modified. Wayne N. Outten, Unique Questions in the Age Discrimination Case: From the
Plaintiffs Perspective, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1993, at 161,173-74
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-464, 1993).
66. See Alfred Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACr-A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 110 (M. Lake ed. 1982); Pamela S. Krop,
Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837, 854
n.80 (1982).
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more complex. Many neutral factors, such as the normal
predominance of younger workers entering the workforce in
combination with older ones leaving, tend to skew the statistics,
making age based disparate impact cases rarer than those based on
other protected classes.67 Furthermore, "courts tend to apply a
disparate treatment analysis [to age discrimination cases], even where
a neutral policy or rule is being challenged"-the type of
discrimination cases in which disparate impact theory is normally
utilized when the discrimination is covered under Title VII.68
B. Development and Rationale of Disparate Impact Theory
In order to consider whether disparate impact theory should be
an applicable theory of recovery under the ADEA, a review of the
historical development of and rationale that supports the theory is
necessary. Disparate impact theory was first established in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,69 a case alleging racial discrimination in
employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 In
Griggs, the employer had blatantly discriminated on the basis of race
in hiring and assigning employees prior to the effective date of Title
VII.7' On the date Title VII became effective, the employer
established a requirement that employees successfully pass two
different aptitude tests and possess a high school diploma before they
could be eligible for any but the lowest paying jobs, to which African-
Americans had previously been restricted. These requirements,
though facially neutral, had the effect of making a disproportionate
number of African-Americans ineligible for jobs with the employer.'
The Supreme Court held that these requirements violated Title
VII because Congress' intent in enacting civil rights legislation
included the "consequences of employment practices, not simply the
67. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975).
68. Outten, supra note 65, at 167 (citing Bovers v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 979 F.2d 291
(2d Cir. 1992)); see also Robert K. Sholl & Dean A. Strang, Age Discrimination and the
Modem Reduction in Force, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 331, 338 (1986) (noting that few ADEA
cases have been brought under disparate impact theory); J. Stratton Shartel, Attorneys
Identify Range of Issues in Litigating Age Discrimination Suits, 7 INSIDE LITIG., July 1993,
available in WESTLAW, JLR database, at WL4 ("Age discrimination cases are rarely
brought under [disparate impact] theory.....
69. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
70. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII § 703,78 Stat. 255,255 (1964.) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
71. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-27.
72. Id. at 427-29.
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motivation." 73 Therefore, the Court struck down the employment
practice, concluding that the requirements would perpetuate the
history of past discrimination against African-Americans and thus
freeze the existing discriminatory composition of the defendant
employer's workforce.7 4 The Griggs Court held that Congress
"placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question."'75 Disparate impact analysis encompasses this wider view
of employment discrimination that requires no showing of scienter.76
As the Griggs Court wrote, "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as 'built-in headwinds.' ",77 This was a great leap
forward by the Court in attempting to ensure that the goals of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were given effect in substance, not just in
form.
The Supreme Court extended disparate impact theory in
Connecticut v. Teal.78 In Teal, the employer required its employees
to pass a written test as a first step in obtaining permanent status as
supervisors.79 A much larger percentage of white candidates than
African-American candidates passed the test (seventy-nine percent to
fifty-four percent), and the plaintiff claimed that this test violated
Title VII due to its disparate impact on African-Americans.
However, the employer promoted 22.9% of the identified African-
American candidates and only 13.5% of the identified white can-
didates,0 and argued therefore that at the "bottom line" the policy
(the test) did not adversely affect African-American candidates."
The Teal Court rejected the notion that this "bottom-line" showing
could insulate an employer against liability for one element of a
system when it was shown that the element in question had a
disparate impact on members of a protected class. 2 The Court held
that Congress intended Title VII to achieve equality in employment
opportunities for each individual, not just equity in the overall
73. Id. at 432.
74. Id at 430.
75. Id. at 432.
76. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1042.
77. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
78. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
79. Id. at 443.
80. Id. at 444.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 454.
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number of minorities actually hired or promoted. 3  Therefore, a
plaintiff could recover by showing that a specific provision in the
employment policy resulted in an adverse effect, even if in the end
the adverse impact was watered down by other aspects of the policy.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,' the Supreme Court
further extended the applicability of disparate impact theory. An
African-American employee filed a race discrimination claim under
Title VII after she had applied for promotion four times, only to see
the job given to a white employee each time.' The employee
claimed that the employer's subjective promotion criteria permitted
racial bias to infect employment decisions.86 The Watson Court held
that disparate impact theory applies not only to objective criteria
(such as the scored standardized test in Teal) but also to subjective
decision making in matters such as hiring and promotion.' Writing
for the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that to hold otherwise would
nullify the protections of Griggs because it would allow employers
simply to add subjective factors to their objective standards to escape
a disparate impact challenge.88  Watson followed Teal in
demonstrating the Court's interest in ensuring that the Civil Rights
Act's goal of protecting individuals from discrimination would be put
into practice.
However, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,89 the Court
reversed this trend by creating an evidentiary standard applicable to
disparate impact cases that seemed to be a significant departure from
Griggs.9" In Wards Cove, Filipino and Native-American cannery
employees charged that their employer's hiring and promotion policies
violated Title VII by forcing segregation by national origin and race
in the workforce.9 ' The Court of Appeals had held that once a
83. Id. at 453.
84. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
85. Id. at 982.
86. Id. at 984.
87. Id. at 990-91.
88. Id. at 990; see also Barbara A. Lee, Subjective Employment Practices and Disparate
Impact: Unresolved Issues, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 403,409-11 (1989/90) (concluding that
Watson extended disparate impact analysis to all subjective employment factors).
89. 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989).
90. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 41, at 36.
91. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48. The cannery workers claimed that practices such
as nepotism, rehiring preferences, separate hiring channels for cannery and non-cannery
jobs, and the refusal to promote from within caused a segregated workforce of
predominantly white non-cannery workers and overwhelmingly minority cannery workers.
Furthermore, at the two Alaskan salmon canneries at issue, the housing and eating
facilities for cannery and non-cannery workers were segregated. Id.
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plaintiff succeeded in proving a prima facie case of discrimination, it
was up to the defendant to respond and attempt to rebut the
plaintiff's proof.9" The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that in a
Title VII employment discrimination case involving disparate impact
the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.93 Thus,
in these discrimination cases, even after the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination, the employer has only the burden
of producing evidence, not the burden of persuasion.94 Moreover,
after Wards Cove, the plaintiff must identify the particular practices
that create the alleged disparate impact, and must show that the
practices have the requisite causation-a "significantly disparate"
impact on employment opportunities."5 The employer may still
rebut the showing of disparate impact by producing evidence that the
practices serve legitimate employment goals in a significant, though
not indispensable, way.96  Clearly this was a step away from the
Court's decisions in Teal, Watson, and even Griggs itself.
Largely in response to the Wards Cove decision, Congress
enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act [1991 CRA]. 7 One of the main
goals of the 1991 CRA was to overrule the Wards Cove decision by
specifically allowing the establishment of an unlawful employment
practice by use of disparate impact theory.98 Under the 1991 CRA,
92. Id at 659.
93. Id. at 659-60.
94. Id. The burden of production requires the defendant only to offer evidence
providing a reasonable justification for its action in order to shift the burden of proof of
discrimination back to the plaintiff. Under the burden of persuasion, the defendant would
have to offer evidence capable of persuading the fact-finder that it had a reasonable
justification for its action for the burden to be shifted back to the plaintiff. See 1 EGLIT,
supra note 19, § 7.49, at 7-294 to 7-300.
95. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658-59. There is, however, no formula for establishing
a significant disparity, and the difficulty in doing so often causes disparate impact cases to
fail. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
96. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60. Before Wards Cove, if a plaintiff could point to
any alternative employment practice that served the same goal without causing as great
a disparate impact on a protected class as the practice alleged to have a discriminatory
effect, this showing would create liability for the employer. After Wards Cove, the plaintiff
has to show both that there was disparate impact and that the practice does not serve a
legitimate goal of the employer. Id.
97. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1993)). Section 105 of the 1991 CRA amended
§ 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
98. The 1991 CRA states that the Wards Cove decision "weakened the scope and
effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections," and that Congress intended to codify the
concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" that previously existed under the Griggs
case and its subsequent history before Wards Cove was decided. Civil Rights Act of 1991,
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once a showing of disparate impact is made, the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion shift to the employer to show that "the challenged
practice is job related ... and consistent with business necessity."99
Even if the employer successfully makes the required showing of
business necessity, the plaintiff may nonetheless win by showing that
there are alternative practices having no disparate impact but still
serving the employer's legitimate interests."°  This congressional
action not only attempts to restore employment discrimination law to
its pre-Wards Cove status, but it also clearly manifests Congress'
approval of disparate impact theory as it applies to Title VII's
protected classes.''
The extent to which the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 will be applied to the ADEA is uncertain. The construction of
the ADEA has normally followed that of Title VII,'1 and the prior
practice of some courts suggests that disparate impact analysis
codified in the 1991 CRA will be applied to the ADEA.' ° Some
courts that had occasion to consider ADEA cases during the period
between the issuance of the Wards Cove decision and Congress'
action to counteract that decision did apply Wards Cove to ADEA
disparate impact cases." While enacting the 1991 CRA, Congress
did amend the ADEA in one respect, 5 however it did not
Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2-3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991). Section 105 of the 1991 CRA
amended § 703 of Title VII to specify that an unlawful employment practice may be
established by use of disparate impact theory. Id. § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074-75 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993)).
99. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
100. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 41, at 38.
101. Since disparate impact theory is a judicial creation, see supra notes 69-77 and
accompanying text, the 1991 CRA was a clear signal by Congress that while the Supreme
Court may have grafted disparate impact theory onto Title VII, Congress approved this
decision and supported the availability of the theory to employees in discrimination suits.
For further discussion of this implication, see infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
103. Outten, supra note 65, at 188 (citing Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1980), where the court applied the Griggs test to an ADEA claim).
104. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766,771-73 (11th Cir. 1991);
Davidson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univs., 920 F.2d 441, 444 (7th Cir.
1990); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 873-75 (6th Cir. 1990); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1369-72 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1026 (1990). This would seem to require those same courts now to apply the 1991
CRA to ADEA disparate impact cases, since this legislation was a direct attempt to
overrule the Wards Cove decision. See e.g., Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc.,
979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The treatment of disparate impact claims under
Title VII, and arguably the treatment of such claims arising under the ADEA, has been
altered by the recent enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .. .
105. See infra note 239.
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specifically amend the ADEA to allow recovery via disparate impact
theory, as it did with Title VII. °6 Therefore, a strong argument can
be made that the Wards Cove decision is still controlling for cases
brought under the ADEA.' 7
III. WHY DISPARATE IMPACr THEORY Is POTENTIALLY SO
IMPORTANT
If disparate impact theory is made an available form of recovery
under the ADEA, the field of age discrimination litigation would be
dramatically altered. Under the traditional disparate treatment theory
available under the ADEA, an employee must offer evidence of an
employer's discriminatory treatment of that employee-namely proof
of the employer's motive or intent to treat that older worker more
harshly than younger workers." In contrast, under a disparate
impact theory, the employee need not show that the employment
decision was based on an employer's motive to discriminate.0 9
Motive, often the hardest factor to prove1 because it is subjective,
existing only within the actor's mind and not readily proven by direct
evidence, becomes inconsequential.
If disparate impact is available, to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact under the ADEA a plaintiff would be required to:
(1) identify the particular employment practice or decision criterion
being challenged; (2) show disparate impact on the basis of age; and
(3) show that the practice in question has caused employment
decisions (such as the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions)
106. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
107. For a detailed analysis of whether the 1991 CRA or the Wards Cove decision
should control cases brought under the ADEA, see Howard C. Eglit, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts
and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093 (1993) (concluding that because
Congress did not amend the ADEA with the 1991 CRA, Wards Cove is still controlling
for ADEA cases). See also infra note 240 (discussing the applicability of the 1991 CRA
to ADEA cases and citing cases addressing this issue).
108. WAKE FOREST UNWVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 41, at 39; see also
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335-36 n.15 (1977) (noting
that in a disparate treatment claim, an employee is attempting to show that the
employment policy or practice in question caused the plaintiff employee to be treated less
favorably than others, and to show that the employer had a discriminatory motive).
109. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
110. Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More "Senior") Dog Yet:
The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins, 11 HOFMTRA LAB. L.J.
391, 423 (1994) ("It is difficult to prove employer motivation.").
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made on the basis of the plaintiff's age.' The evidence must show
a statistical disparity between the protected group's representation in
the employer's workforce as against the qualified pool which is
sufficiently substantial to raise an inference of causation."
Once a plaintiff shows that the application of a particular
employment practice (or group of practices) disparately impacts the
members of the protected class, the burden of producing evidence
shifts to the employer to try to overcome this showing." This may
be attempted in a number of ways. Often the employer will challenge
the statistics the plaintiff claims show the adverse impact." 4 The
employer may claim that there is an insufficient sample size, that the
impact is not sufficiently disparate despite the statistics presented, or
that the statistics alone do not have sufficient probative value without
also reviewing the policy or practice in question in relation to the job,
the working community and any specific circumstances of the case
that make this employment setting different from others."
However, even if the employer can make such a showing to overcome
the employee's prima facie case of age discrimination, the employee
has the opportunity to try to show either that the employer's reason
is a pretext for discrimination, or that there exists an alternative
employment practice that does not have a disparate impact, which
also serves the employer's legitimate interests. 6 Instead of (or in
addition to) attacking the statistics proffered by the plaintiff, the
employer may attempt to demonstrate that the challenged practice
falls within a statutory exception to the ADEA."7
If disparate impact theory is applicable to the ADEA, then
merely showing that the employer's policy or action has a disparate
111. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The question of whether
Wards Cove is still controlling for cases brought under the ADEA is discussed supra at
notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
112. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.). There is no formula for establishing a significant disparity, and the
difficulty in doing so often causes disparate impact cases to fail. But compared to offering
evidence of an employer's motive or intent to discriminate, which is often beyond the
means of an employee to prove, the availability of disparate impact doctrine offers another
avenue for seeking recovery. See id. at 989-91.
113. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60.
114. Watson, 487 U.S. at 996-97 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
115. Id
116. Id. at 660-61; see also Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 38-39 (D. Me.
1993) (stating that a plaintiff may attempt to show that "other tests or selection methods
having less discriminatory effects would serve the employer's legitimate interest in
competent performance of the job").
117. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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impact on members of the protected class (employees over age forty)
would establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, which the
employer must rebut. This is a relatively low threshold for such a
dramatic burden shift, thus highlighting why the application of
disparate impact to the ADEA is potentially so important: With a
reduced burden of proof on the plaintiff, not only are claims more
likely to be successful on the merits, but claims also have an even
greater chance to survive an employer's motion for summary
judgment."' This would raise the stakes dramatically for employers
and alter the strategy and risk calculus used by both parties in
employment discrimination suits brought under the ADEA."9
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
disparate impact theory is a valid theory of recovery under the
ADEAY Disparate impact theory was developed and is usually
pursued only in Title VII litigation. Of the many United States
Federal District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals that have
encountered cases presenting this precise issue, some have accepted
the theory as valid under the ADEA;2 ' some have reserved making
118. See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 305-17 and accompanying text.
120. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993). The Hazen decision
was limited to disparate treatment theory because the plaintiff, suing under the ADEA,
did not include a disparate impact claim. Id. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, stated that he was joining the
Court's opinion in Hazen on the understanding that the Court was not addressing the issue
of the applicability of disparate impact theory in ADEA cases. Id. at 1710 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy underscored that the majority's opinion should not be read
to imply that disparate impact will succeed in ADEA cases, and that there were serious
questions about the propriety of extending the doctrine from Title VII to ADEA cases.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
More than a decade before Hazen, then-Justice Rehnquist stated, "This Court has
never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish a violation of the ADEA."
Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting), denying cert. to
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
121. See, ag., First Circuit: Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986)
(assuming, without analysis, that the ADEA, like Title VII, allows a claim of
discrimination under disparate impact analysis); Second Circuit: Maresco v. Evans
Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The disparate impact doctrine, developed
under Title VII, is also applicable to cases under the ADEA."); Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980) (accepting the application of disparate impact theory to ADEA
cases), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Third Circuit- MacNamara v. Korean Airlines,
863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (accepting the
application of disparate impact theory to the ADEA without analysis); Sixth Circuit:
Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991) (assuming theory is
applicable to the ADEA); Abbot v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990)
(accepting applicability without analysis, based on acceptance by two other courts); Seventh
Circuit: Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992)
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a decision on the issue," hoping that the Supreme Court will weigh
in with its opinion; and some have concluded that the theory should
not apply to the ADEA.'P Moreover, those courts that have
accepted the theory "have either assumed that the disparate impact
doctrine applies under the ADEA, or have concluded that it applies
without any formal analysis of the issue."'24 Furthermore, the issue
(stating that the weight of authority is that disparate impact is a viable doctrine under the
ADEA); Eighth Circuit- Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th
Cir. 1983) (assuming theory is applicable to the ADEA); Ninth Circuit. EEOC v. Local
350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (assuming disparate
impact theory is applicable to the ADEA); Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245,1247
(9th Cir. 1987) (same); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984)
(adopting disparate impact theory due to similarities between the ADEA and Title VII);
Eleventh Circuit- MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766,770-71 (11th Cir.
1991) (assuming applicability of theory to the ADEA and detailing requirements necessary
to establish a disparate impact claim under the ADEA).
122. The Circuit for the District of Columbia, the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits have
explicitly reserved this issue for future resolution. See Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.,
3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir. 1993) (reserving a decision on applicability of the theory to
the ADEA "until such time as the issue is properly presented and argued before this
court"); Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing
to decide whether disparate impact theory is applicable to an ADEA case because practice
at issue does not have a disparate impact on employees over forty), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
846 (1989); Akins v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1984) (viewing the
issue of disparate impact analysis as an open one, but refusing to resolve it). The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals purported to reserve the issue as well, Fisher v. Transco Services-
Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992), but this reservation is in stark
contrast to the same court's apparent acceptance of disparate impact theory under the
ADEA in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1206-11 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the firing of higher-paid, more senior employees to save salary costs violates ADEA
because allowing such economic discrimination would undermine the policies of the
ADEA) and their recent apparent reversal of Metz in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch.,
41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that basing a hiring decision on salary costs
which are based on seniority, a factor with a high correlation with age, does not violate the
ADEA).
123. See, e.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[D]ecisions based on criteria which merely tend to affect workers over the age of forty
more adversely than workers under forty are not prohibited [by the ADEA]."); Hiatt v.
Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1433-36 (D. Wyo. 1994) (concluding that disparate
impact theory is not applicable to the ADEA, after noting that the Tenth Circuit has only
assumed the applicability of disparate impact theory without deciding the issue); Martincic
v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1076-78 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding
that Supreme Court's Hazen decision overrides the Third Circuit's previous suggestion that
disparate impact is applicable to the ADEA).
124. Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1433 (D. Wyo. 1994). For example,
in the first two ADEA cases to accept disparate impact theory, Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) and Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983), neither court discussed the basis for applying
disparate impact analysis. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1050-51. Both opinions simply rely
on the precedential value of Title VII litigation in interpreting the ADEA. Id.
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has lead to much academic debate, with various legal scholars and
practitioners reaching different conclusions.'21 For both the
employee entitled to the ADEA's protection and the employer
making employment decisions (not to mention their respective
attorneys and the judges trying to resolve such lawsuits), these
differing views have created quite a dilemma. However, a thorough
analysis of both sides of the debate leads to the conclusion that
disparate impact theory should not apply to the ADEA.
IV. DISPARATE IMPACT SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE ADEA
BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ADEA AND
TITLE VII
Disparate impact theory was developed with a focus on
employment discrimination affecting members of Title VII's protected
classes of race, gender, national origin, and religion; and it has been
a strong device for combating such discrimination. Age, however, is
a characteristic unique from Title VI's classes, and thus the ADEA
has its own language, history, and goals distinct from Title VII. To
attempt to construe the ADEA to incorporate disparate impact theory
would be to ignore the critical differences in the language and
purposes of the ADEA and Title VII;1  it would require one to
ignore the legislative and administrative histories of the ADEA;127
it would fail to recognize the differences between age and other
125. Compare Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 108 (questioning whether theory should
apply to age due to the differences between age and Title VII categories); Mack A. Player,
Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the ADEA: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA.
L. REv. 621, 624-25 (1983) (doubting theory's applicability); Donald R. Stacy, A Case
Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to the ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437
(1984) (asserting that the theory should not be available); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age
Discrimination, Wages and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 715, 729-30 (1990) (positing that the theory is probably unavailable because of its
contradictions with statutory language and exceptions of the ADEA); and Krop, supra
note 66, at 838 (arguing that disparate impact theory should not be available under the
ADEA) with Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten
Affirmative Defense. The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV.
155, 216-17 (1986) (expressing a more positive view as to the theory's applicability);
Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 279-87 (purporting to offer "a more balanced approach" and
thereby accept the theory under the ADEA); and Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1040 (asserting
that the theory should be available under the ADEA).
126. See infra notes 130-89 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 190-247 and accompanying text.
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protected characteristics;" and it would be contrary to the policy
that supports the theory's use under Title VII' 29
A. Comparison of the Statutory Language of ADEA and Title VII
Disparate impact theory that developed under Title VII should
not be applied to the ADEA because there are numerous significant
differences between the substantive provisions of Title VII and the
ADEA. While there are many similarities between. Title VII and the
ADEA, when one actually compares the two statutes the distinctions
between the language of the ADEA and Title VII demonstrate that
while disparate impact theory fits within the language of Title VII, it
conflicts with and is negated by the language of the ADEA.
1. The Fallacy of the Statutes' Similarities
Those who argue in favor of extending disparate impact theory
to the ADEA are forced to place a heavy emphasis on the general
similarities between the statutory language of the ADEA and the
language of Title VII.' Admittedly, at first glance this is an
appealing argument. Because the ADEA was modeled after Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"l both statutes' provisions are
largely identical in wording and purpose.32 The Supreme Court, in
Lorillard, Division of Loew's Theaters, Inc. v. Pons,33 recognized
that there are important similarities in the aims and substantive
prohibitions of Title VII and the ADEAPM In Oscar Mayer & Co.
128. See infra notes 248-301 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
130. See Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1040.
131. Pub L. No. 88-352, ch. 21, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
132. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1039. Compare, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) ("It shall
be unlawful for an employer-(I) to fail to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.... .") with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. . . ."). As one commentator specifically points out,
when comparing the statutes, they are similar enough that "age" can easily be substituted
for Title VII's protected categories. Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 230.
133. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
134. Id. at 584. Most of the ADEA's substantive provisions were "lifted verbatim from
Title VII," Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 230, or "derived in haec verba from Title VII,"
Lorillard, Div. of Loew's Theaters, Inc., 434 U.S. at 584.
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v. Evans,35 the Supreme Court also accepted the parallel nature of
the two acts as "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress
intended parallel procedural provisions of Title VII and the ADEA
to be similarly construed.'36 The Oscar Mayer Court held that "the
ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace,"'" and many lower federal courts
have followed the Supreme Court's lead in applying many of the
standards developed under Title VII to ADEA cases.138
However, the fact that Title VII and the ADEA are "statutory
relatives,.., does not make them twins. There are indeed important
distinctions between the two statutes which have precluded the
development of completely parallel bodies of case law."139  The
problem with relying on the similarities between the ADEA and Title
VII is illustrated by an analysis of Geller v. Markham,'" the first
major decision to apply disparate impact theory to an ADEA case.
Geller relies on Lorillard and Oscar Mayer as precedent,' 4' despite
the fact that "neither case [truly] supports the proposition that
disparate impact doctrine applies to ADEA cases.' ' 142 In fact, the
Lorillard decision directly contradicts the attempt to apply disparate
impact to the ADEA. The holding in Lorillard-that there is a right
to jury trial under the ADEA'43 -is antithetical to the notion that
the ADEA and Title VII should always be treated similarly, because
135. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
136. Id. at 758.
137. Id at 756.
138. See Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 230; Krop, supra note 66, at 837. For a recent
affirmation of this principle, see Csicseri v. Bowsher, 862 F. Supp. 547,568 (D. D.C. 1994)
(recognizing the validity of the use of Title VII analyses and ideas for ADEA cases).
139. Eglit, supra note 107, at 1101 n.36. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said in
considering whether to apply Title VII judicial precedent to the ADEA, "[t]hat the
[ADEA] is embodied in a separate act and has its own unique history at least counsels the
examiner to consider the particular problems sought to be reached by the statute."
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 255 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[It is] inappropriate simply to
transplant [Title VII] standards in their entirety into a different statutory scheme having
a different history.").
140. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
141. Id at 1032. For a general discussion of Oscar Mayer, see supra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text.
142. Krop, supra note 66, at 841.
143. Lorillard, Div. of Loew's Theaters, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978).
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until Title VII was amended in 1991,"4 jury trials were unavailable
under Title VII. 45
Similarly, although Oscar Mayer did hold that parallel provisions
of the ADEA and Title VII should be similarly construed,"4
because disparate impact doctrine was judicially created in Griggs, not
from the language of Title VII, 4 7 Oscar Mayer's holding does not
offer "much support for extending the disparate impact doctrine" to
the ADEA, regardless of the similarities between the language of the
ADEA and Title VII."4  It is ineffectual to argue that because the
Supreme Court developed the theory in a Title VII case, and because
there are many similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, such a
theory is appropriate under ADEA.49 Such an argument assumes
the two statutes to be more similar than they in fact are."
2. The Language of ADEA Section 4(a)(2)
The impropriety of applying disparate impact theory to the
ADEA becomes even clearer when the actual language of the ADEA
is closely examined. For example, ADEA section 4(a)(2) provides
that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
144. One of the amendments made by Congress to Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. V 1993) and
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), was to provide Title VII litigants the option to have a jury
trial of their claim. Id. § 1977A(c), 105 Stat. at 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)
(Supp. V 1993)). Even prior to the 1991 CRA, the ADEA included this option, see
Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 585, but Title VII did not.
145. Krop, supra note 66, at 841.
146. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) ("[S]ince the language of
[ADEA] §14(b) is almost in haec verba with § 706 [of Title VII] ... we may properly
conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of §
706.").
147. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
148. Krop, supra note 66, at 841-42.
149. Yet this appears to be what the Geller court did. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981). This type of argument is
reminiscent of the classic argument frequently made-but rarely seriously-in college
football, regarding who should be considered the national champion. The argument tends
to go something like this: "If A beat B, B beat C, C beat D, and D beat E, then A should
be the national champion over B, C, D, or E."
150. See Stacy, supra note 125, at 438 (stating that race and age discrimination
"represent different kinds of societal problems, and not all devices appropriate to
combating the former are appropriate to combating the latter"); see also infra notes 190-
301 and accompanying text (discussing the policy justifications behind disparate impact
theory under Title VII and the different policy that supports the ADEA).
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tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age." '' This section could be read to
authorize disparate impact claims under the ADEA if "adversely
affect" implies that an employment practice can constitute illegal
discrimination even if it is not specifically directed at age.12
However, a different and more grammatically correct interpretation
of this section shows that the opposite conclusion should be reached.
Section 4(a)(2) should properly be read to "prohibit limiting,
segregating or classifying employees because of age," which authorizes
only disparate treatment claims. 3  Reading the section this way is
the grammatically correct reading"5 and is also supported by
comparison to section 4(a)(1), which uses similar terms but applies to
disparate treatment only.55 Furthermore, section 4(a)(2) addresses
only actions which affect employees, whereas under a disparate
impact theory, unsuccessful applicants are the most common
claimants, and it seems unlikely that Congress would have meant to
authorize disparate impact in section 4(a)(2) while excluding the
group of plaintiffs most likely to benefit from the theory.'56 Since
ADEA section 4(a)(2), unlike its "mirror" section in Title VII,57
does not provide a basis for applying disparate impact theory, those
151. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1988).
152. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1051. The very language of the exception could be
interpreted to "forbid] any policy having a more harmful effect on older people than on
their co-workers." Id.
153. Krop, supra note 66, at 843.
154. The phrase "because of age" should be read to modify "limit, segregate, or
classify." Id. Thus, the section "prohibits classifying employees because of their age, so
as to adversely affect their employment status." Id. Such an "interpretation authorizes
only claims of disparate treatment." Id. The phrase "because of age" would have to
modify the verb "affect" to imply disparate impact claims. Id.
155. Id. ADEA § 4(a)(1) provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of such individual's age . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
"Because of age" implies treatment directly due to the characteristic of age, which is the
hallmark of disparate treatment theory. See also infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text
(discussing RFOTA defense under the ADEA).
156. Krop, supra note 66, at 843. Subsection (2) of Title VII, the basis for the Griggs
decision, proscribes any actions by employers which "limit, segregate, or classify [their]
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would ... adversely affect his
status as an employee" on the basis of his membership in a protected class. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). ADEA's "mirror" provision omits "applicants for
employment." ADEA § 4(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1988). In light of ADEA's near
verbatim adoption of Title VII language, the exclusion of job applicants from subsection
(2) of the ADEA is noteworthy. See Krop, supra note 66, at 843-44.
157. Title VII § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(a)(2) (1988).
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seeking to extend the theory to the ADEA search the statutory
language for any statutory basis. But this search is fruitless because
there are no other statutory provisions of the ADEA that provide the
basis for applying disparate impact, such as the Griggs Court found
under Title VII.5
3. Statutory Defense: RFOTA
Not only does the ADEA lack any statutory foothold for
implying disparate impact theory, the specific statutory defenses
included in the ADEA show convincingly that disparate impact theory
was not intended to be a method of recovery under the ADEA. The
defense most obviously inconsistent with disparate impact theory is
the RFOTA defense, ADEA section 4(f)(1),'59 which allows an
employer to defend an age discrimination claim on the ground that it
was a differentiation based on a "reasonable factor other than
age."'6' This defense "is not limited to a specific type of employer
conduct"'61-it "allow[s] employers to base employment decisions
on reasonable factors that may accompany aging, so long as the
decisions are not motivated by age bias."' 62 The RFOTA defense
158. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-36 (1971); Krop, supra note 66,
at 844.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
160. Id. In contrast, Title VII has no equivalent to RFOTA. See Michael D. Moberly,
Reconsidering the Discriminatory Motive Requirement in ADEA Disparate Treatment Cases,
24 N.M. L. REv. 89, 96 (1994) ("There is no comparable provision [to the ADEA's
RFOTA defense] in Title VII ....").
161. Stacy, supra note 125, at 451.
162. Krop, supra note 66, at 845. The ADEA was designed to prevent arbitrary age
discrimination (disparate treatment, not disparate impact), and therefore the factor used
to differentiate among employees should be considered "reasonable" so long as it is not
arbitrary. See id.
The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the body charged with
enforcing the ADEA, see infra note 299, has taken the position that disparate impact
applies under the ADEA, and has issued guidelines which forbid the use of cost-a facially
neutral policy that adversely affects older workers-as an RFOTA defense. 29 C.F.R. §
1625.7(d)-(f) (1994). Under the EEOC guidelines an employer cannot refuse to hire older
workers because they cost more than younger workers. Id. § 1625.7(0.
However, "[t]he EEOC guideline is [merely] an interpretation of the Act; it is not a
regulation. Accordingly, it does not have the force of law." See Eglit, supra note 107, at
1183 n.303. "[T]he level of deference afforded [an EEOC regulation] 'will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade.' "Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,257 (1991) (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)))). Furthermore, where EEOC regulations conflict with the
statute they purport to interpret, as they do here, they have been set aside as having no
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means that "decisions which are made for reasons independent of age
but which happen to correlate with age are not actionable under the
ADEA."'6' The basis of a disparate impact claim of age
discrimination is that a decision or policy, neutral on its face, has an
adverse affect on older workers-that the decision's negative effect
correlates with age.164  The existence of the RFOTA defense
therefore conflicts with an attempt to make a disparate impact
showing of age discrimination, and underscores the inappropriateness
of applying the theory to the ADEA.1'5
Courts that have accepted disparate impact theory in ADEA
cases seem conveniently to ignore the RFOTA defense.166 For
example, in Geller v. Markham,67 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals applied disparate impact to an ADEA claim."' The Geller
court held that an employee could recover upon successfully showing
that a cost-cutting plan to hire teachers based on lesser seniority, and
therefore lesser salary requirements, had a disparate impact upon
members of the employee's protected class, in this case teachers over
forty years of age.169 The Second Circuit found unavailing the
effect. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) ("[EEOC's] 'interpretation'
of the statute cannot supersede the language chosen by Congress."); Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) ("Courts need not defer to an administrative
construction of a statute where there are 'compelling indications that it is wrong.'"
(quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
163. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994); accord
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
correlation [between compensation and age] is not perfect ... [and therefore plaintiff]
could not prove age discrimination even if he was fired simply because [his employer]
desired to reduce its salary costs by discharging him."); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d
1202, 1212 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Wage discrimination is age
discrimination only when wage depends directly on age, so that the use of one is a pretext
for the other; high covariance is not sufficient . ").
164. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701,1705-06 (1993) (quoting International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977)).
165. See Harris, supra note 125, at 730 ("Neutral practices are almost always reasonable
practices and are exempted from coverage [of disparate impact violations]."). Professor
Eglit frames this same argument succinctly: The existence of the RFOTA exception
"debunks the applicability of disparate impact analysis to the ADEA.... [The RFOTA]
provision explicitly approves the use of reasonable factors other than age, and this
approbation extends ... to age-neutral factors, even if they have a disparate impact on
age-defined groups." 1 EGLIT, supra note 19, § 5.19, at 5-79 n.357.
166. See Harris, supra note 125, at 734 ("Both the Geller and Leftwich courts [in
applying disparate impact theory to ADEA cases] showed absolute disregard for the
RFO[T]A defense."); infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
167. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
168. Id at 1032-34.
169. Id.
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school district's defense that the policy was a necessary cost cutting
measure.70 The Geller court held that:
To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for
the purpose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose,
necessarily rests on the assumption that the age factor alone
may be used to justify a differentiation-an assumption
plainly contrary to the terms of [the ADEA] and the
purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based
would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very
discrimination at which the Act is directed.'
Similarly, in Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,'7" the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals used the same logic employed in Geller to
adopt disparate impact as a viable theory for recovery in ADEA
cases. 73 The Leftwich Court held that a policy by the employer of
preferring non-tenured faculty had a disparate impact on older
employees. 74  Furthermore, the monetary savings the policy
achieved was not an adequate defense, and the plaintiff was allowed
to show that less discriminatory means were available to achieve the
employer's legitimate objectives.7" But notably, neither the Second
nor the Eighth Circuit courts even made mention of the RFOTA
defense. Any court that analyzed the RFOTA defense in the context
of facts similar to those in Geller or Leftwich would have trouble
reaching the same conclusion. 76
170. Id. The Geller court did not expressly rule that cost is not relevant under the
business necessity defense, but merely cited decisions holding that the disparate treatment
cannot be justified by a claim of economic savings, see id. at 1034, and a regulation, 29
C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979) (removed at 53 Fed. Reg. 23,812 (1987)), providing that a
differentiation or classification based on age cannot be justified by a general assertion of
cost savings. Krop, supra note 66, at 840 n.15 (citing Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034).
171. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979) (removed at 52
Fed. Reg. 23,812 (1987))).
172. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
173. Id. at 690-93.
174. Id. at 691.
175. Id- at 691-93. This same logic was followed by the Tenth Circuit. See Mistretta
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 592 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that statistics coupled with
other evidence established a prima facie case that the employer's layoff procedure had a
disparate impact on older workers).
176. For example, in its recent decision in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced a similar fact pattern involving a school district's
decision that because teacher salaries were linked to experience, it could not afford to pay
for teachers with more than five years of experience. 41 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Seventh Circuit panel relied in part on the RFOTA defense to state that
"[employment] decisions which are made for reasons independent of age but which happen
to correlate with age are not actionable under the ADEA." Id. at 1077. The RFOTA
defense supports the inapplicability of disparate impact to the ADEA because "a sensible
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In stark contrast to the Geller and Leftwich courts, the Fifth
Circuit has recognized the importance of the RFOTA defense. In
Smith v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,77 the court held that "the
burden of rebutting an ADEA plaintiff's prima facie case [of age
discrimination] requires no more than producing evidence that the
employment decision was based upon reasonable factors other than
age."' 7 This same recognition regarding the RFOTA defense was
made by then-Justice Relnquist in his dissent to the Court's denial of
certiorari to Geller.79 Justice Rehnquist supported the view that
Congress did not intend to enable an ADEA plaintiff to recover
where an employment decision based on experience has nothing to do
with age, and suggested that "Congress revealed this intention in 29
U.S.C. section 623(f)(1)"-the RFOTA defense."m
The existence of the RFOTA defense within the ADEA simply
undermines the entire concept of disparate impact theory and any
attempt to include it as a form of recovery under the ADEA. 8'
Moreover, the reason disparate impact theory has been understood to
be consistent with Title VII claims is because Title VII has no parallel
to the RFOTA defense." The ADEA contains this statutory
interpretation of [the RFOTA defense] is that it is further evidence of the ADEA's focus
on eliminating decisions made based [only] on stereotypes about age." Id.
177. 650 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1981).
178. Id. at 67. This requires merely a showing of "some reason other than age." Id.
Such a "reason other than age" existed in both Geller and Leftwich-both employers made
their employment decisions based on the salary cost of more experienced teachers-and
one can only wonder how the analysis and decision in Farah Mfg. was not even mentioned
in the Geller or Leftwich opinions which were decided within a two year period after the
Fifth Circuit's decision.
179. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), denying cert.
to Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
180. Id. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
181. Supporters of extending disparate impact to the ADEA argue that the RFOTA
defense, unlike a similar exception in the Equal Pay Act, which permits wage
discriminations when based on "any other factor other than sex," 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(iv)
(1988), requires the other factors to be "reasonable." See Kaminshine, supra note 3, at
299-302. It is argued that this language implies a disparate impact concept of business
necessity by applying a test of reasonableness to factors that are not age-based in their
intent. Id. However, the "factor other than sex" defense under the Equal Pay Act was
created for a very different purpose, see Stacy, supra note 125, at 446-47, and the Supreme
Court has held that incorporating such an argument into Title VII could have significant
unintended consequences. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168-71
(1981). Therefore, the argument seems equally unavailing as to the ADEA.
182. Stacy, supra note 125, at 446. "Title VII, the only antidiscrimination statute in
which the Supreme Court has found a disparate impact construction, has no provision
analogous to [the] ADEA's 'reasonable factor other than age' [defense]." Id.
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defense, and this difference from Title VII "pulls the rug out from
under" any argument for applying disparate impact to the ADEA.
4. Other ADEA Statutory Defenses Distinct from Title VII
The RFOTA defense is not the only one of the ADEA's
statutory defenses which is incompatible with disparate impact theory.
The BFOQ defense, ADEA section 4 (f)(1),"m is also inconsistent
with any argument that disparate impact is applicable under the Act.
The ADEA is premised on the concept that age alone is a poor
predictor of individual capabilities, and that employees should be
judged on their individual merits." 4 Yet the BFOQ defense recog-
nizes that age may at some point affect performance.Y The ADEA
was not intended to protect employees from their own performance
deterioration. 6 In contrast, Title VII does not make this recog-
nition because characteristics such as race or gender do not affect an
employee's ability to perform the job. 7  Similarly, under ADEA
section 4(f)(2)(B), an employer will be shielded from liability for a
claim of age discrimination if the employer's action follows the terms
of a bona fide employee benefit plan."s This defense to an age
discrimination claim recognizes valid differences between older and
younger workers and the costs of providing them traditional employee
benefits.189  All of these statutory defenses created in the ADEA
183. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
184. See Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 235.
185. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
186. Broad use of the BFOQ defense could undermine the goals of the ADEA, and
even age limits that are based on accurate generalizations can cause some members of the
protected group who are actually capable of performing to be deemed unqualified. See
Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 246-47. Therefore, the BFOQ exception is generally given
a very narrow application, subject to careful review. See id at 247-48. As part of this
effort, the burden of persuasion has been placed on an employer to show that a specific
age-based decision is exempted from the ADEA as an age BFOQ. See Western Air Lines
v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,419-21 (1985) (holding that an employer must show (1) that the
age limitation is reasonably necessary to the essential aspects of the business; and (2) that
there is a factual basis for the presumption that all persons outside the age limitation
cannot perform the job safely or efficiently or that it is not feasible for the employer to
make a case-by-case determination of ability to perform). The EEOC regulations provide
for a similar test for establishing the BFOQ defense. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1994).
But even if it is narrowly applied, the ADEA's BFOQ defense is still incompatible with
any application of disparate impact theory.
187. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
188. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
189. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. Additionally, the affirmative
defense for actions taken in compliance with bona fide seniority systems, ADEA §
4(f)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993), provides a much broader protection
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point to the same conclusion-that disparate impact theory is
inconsistent with the ADEA's statutory language. The statutory
language not only does not support applying disparate impact theory,
but it also contradicts such an argument.
B. Legislative History
1. The Different Impetus Behind the ADEA
In addition to significant differences in statutory language, the
ADEA and Title VII were adopted with separate purposes and
unique histories."9 Prior to enactment of the ADEA, little atten-
tion or effort had been paid at the federal level to the issue of age
discrimination in the workplace.' This is certainly in stark contrast
to the long, tumultuous, and at times violent civil rights struggle that
captured the public's attention and culminated in passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,'9 which included Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination in the workplace.'93 One commentator has asserted
that the Civil Rights Act "was a direct response to the civil unrest of
the early 1960's. Its passage ... was a response, much akin to an
apology, for acts of violence by whites in retaliation for moderate civil
rights activity."' 94
During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, attempts
were made to include age in the list of groups to be considered
protected classes under Title VII, the Act's employment
provision. 5 But, in contrast to Title VII's focus on discrimination
based on race, discrimination based on age was not viewed as a
widespread social problem. 9 6  In fact, age was viewed in such a
different context that attempts to include it as a protected class under
from liability than any similar provision under Title VII. This is just one more example
of the differences between the statutory language of Title VII and the ADEA.
190. See supra note 139; see, e.g., Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307,312 (6th Cir.
1975). ("[The [ADEA] is embodied in a separate act and has its own unique history
[compared to Title VII] ... ").
191. See 1 EGLrr, supra note 19, §2.02, at 2-7 n.33.
192. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
194. Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment and The Displaced
Homemaker, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 107, 114.
195. 110 CONG. REC. 2596-99, 9911-13 (1964).
196. See Yarbrough, supra note 194, at 114.
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Title VII were rejected."9 Congress did, however, within the Civil
Rights Act, direct the Secretary of Labor to study age discrimination
in employment so as to be able to make recommendations to
Congress for dealing with the problem, if it existed.'98
2. Arbitrariness: A Different Focus Than Title VII
In 1965, Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz reported to Congress on
his findings'99 and, at Congress' further request, submitted legislative
recommendations that later became the ADEA.' ° The Labor
Secretary's Report concluded that the main concern regarding older
workers was arbitrary age discrimination based on misconceptions
about the abilities of older workersYm  In the Report, age
discrimination was distinguished from other forms of discrimination
(e.g., race) which result from feelings about people entirely unrelated
to their ability to do the job.' The Report found that there was no
significant discrimination of this kind so far as older workers were
concerned.' Furthermore, the Secretary's Report distinguished
between arbitrary age discrimination, such as the use of specific age
limits on hiring and termination based on stereotypes about older
workers, and practices which tend to bear more strongly on older
workers than on younger ones -a distinction which is completely
197. An amendment to include age among Title VII's protected classes which was
offered by Representative Dowdy was rejected by a 123 to 94 vote. 110 CONG. REC. 2596-
99 (1964).
Some commentators suggest that Senator Jacob Javits (R-New York), a strong
supporter and leader of age discrimination legislation, backed off proposed amendments
to the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include age among the protected classes, out of fear that
the amendment might jeopardize the entire bill's passage. See Ziegler, supra note 10, at
1053.
198. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (1964).
199. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter "SECRETARY'S
REPORT"].
200. In response to the Secretary's Report, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1966 were enacted by Congress, directing the Secretary to submit specific legislative
recommendation. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606,
80 Stat. 830, 845 (1966). A draft bill was submitted to Congress in early 1967 and was
debated, passed, and signed into law on December 15, 1967. Age Discrimination In
Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
201. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 199, at 2.
202. Id. at 2-5.
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id. at 21-25.
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parallel to the difference between disparate treatment and disparate
impact.2' The former were prohibited under the ADEA; the latter
were not, and were to be addressed by other social and employment
programs.' This distinction shows that the Report, the basis for
the ADEA, did not support statutory recovery for disparate impact,
but only for disparate treatment.' This dichotomy was endorsed
by Congress,' 8 and the ADEA was enacted to prohibit "arbitrary
age discrimination in employment,"'  such as the rejection of older
workers solely based on assumptions about the effect of age on their
ability to do a job, discrimination which can be attacked with
disparate treatment liability.
A simple example of the ADEA's focus on "arbitrariness" is
offered by the First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Holt v.
Gamewell.210 In Holt, an employee was discharged after his
managerial position was eliminated because of its high salary."
The court found that choosing to discharge higher paid employees was
not in and of itself age discrimination.' The Holt court concluded
that while salary may be directly related to seniority, any correlation
between seniority and age depends on at what age the employee
began working for the employer.2 3 Discharging the employee who
was within the protected class of the ADEA did not violate the
statute because his high salary was not the result of his age, but was
due to his position and his success on the job.2"' In essence, the
decision was not made by using age either as an arbitrary cut-off point
or as a factor which was assumed to mean that the employee was no
longer capable. Age was not used to make the employment decision
at all-the employee's paycheck was the determining factor.
205. See id. at 2-6. Not only does the report focus on "arbitrary" discrimination, but
it recognizes that there are "certain circumstances which unquestionably affect older
workers more strongly as a group than they do younger workers." Md. at 11. These
circumstances include increased health concerns and health costs that arise with age, the
frequent lower education levels of older workers, and possible lessening of productivity.
Stacy, supra note 125, at 440-41.
206. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 199, at 5-17,21-22; see ADEA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 622(a) (1988).
207. Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 79.
208. See Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 290.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
210. 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986).
211. Id. at 37.
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"[D]isparate impact doctrine is not designed to eliminate
practices based on ill-conceived stereotypes of the aged; it is designed
to eliminate neutral practices that happen to have a statistically
adverse effect on the aged."21 No reference to such an expansive
protection exists in the legislative history of the ADEA. The
legislative history of the ADEA shows the preoccupation of the
Congress, not with practices neutral on their face which had an
adverse effect because of age, but rather with specific practices which
overtly restricted opportunities because of age.216 In contrast, Title
VII was enacted to eradicate all discrimination against protected
classes in employment, and as the Griggs Court found, disparate
impact theory was needed to ensure this result.217 Disparate. impact
recovery, therefore, was not what Congress intended to establish with
the ADEA.21' As the legislative history shows, the ADEA was
meant to prohibit only arbitrary discrimination, not facially neutral
"actions which tend to fall more harshly on older individuals. ' 219
3. The Judicial Foundation of Disparate Impact Theory Under
Title VII
There are other specific differences in the legislative histories of
Title VII and the ADEA that illuminate why disparate impact applies
215. Harris, supra note 125, at 729.
216. See Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 90-93.
217. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-31 (1971). One commentator argues
that the ADEA's legislative sponsors intended that the ADEA have the same effect as
Title VII--"to rid the workplace of all forms of age discrimination." Ziegler, supra note
10, at 1054-55. Support for this argument is offered by a statement of Senator Yarborough
(D-Texas), one of the ADEA's original sponsors and one of the bill's strongest supporters,
that the ADEA's purpose was to "give every American... the opportunity to be equally
considered for employment and promotion." 113 CoNG. REc. 31,251-54 (1967). Since
disparate impact analysis in Griggs refers to the idea of equal opportunity in Title VII,
Senator Yarborough's emphasis on equal opportunity for older workers could lead to the
implication that the Griggs analysis should apply to the ADEA. Ziegler, supra note 10,
at 1054-55. However, evidence of this intention is not reflected in the language of the
ADEA itself and conflicts with the ADEA's stress on ridding the workplace of "arbitrary"
age discrimination. See supra notes 199-216 and accompanying text.
218. The fact that the ADEA's "preliminary statement of findings and purpose refers
separately to arbitrary age discrimination" and specific practices which may disadvantage
older workers, combined with congressional hearings and floor debates focusing on unjust
age restrictions as the principle concern show that Congress "endorsed the dichotomy as
described in the [Secretary's R]eport and thereby intended to prohibit only overt age
discrimination, i.e., discrimination based on 'the deliberate disregard of a worker's ability
solely because of age.' " Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 290 (quoting Blumrosen, supra note
66, at 86).
219. See Krop, supra note 66, at 851 n.60.
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to Title VII claims but not to ADEA cases. For instance, while the
legislative history of ADEA section 4(a)(2)1 does not reveal the
purpose of the section, it was apparently borrowed from Title VII
section 703(a)(2), z' which, when the ADEA was passed, was not
intended to authorize disparate impact.'m The creation and accep-
tance of disparate impact theory came only with Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,21 four years after the passage of the ADEA, and seven
years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Since the disparate
impact test was judicially established in Griggs it does not have its
origins in Title VII, and therefore similarities between Title VII and
ADEA alone do not offer much support for extending disparate
impact from Title VII classes to the class of older Americans. 4
Moreover, there are clear differences between the Griggs
rationale and the ADEA's rationale: Griggs rests on the theory that
there is nothing inherent in race that supports a correlation between
race and ability to perform a job.' Unlike race, there is a much
stronger argument that there is an inherent correlation between age
and ability.' In fact, the ADEA originally recognized this by
220. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1988). The section provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age ....
I.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). ADEA § 4(a)(2) and Title VII § 703(a)(2) were
identical when first enacted, except for their delineation of protected groups. Title VII
was amended in 1972 specifically to cover "applicants for employment." Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 8(a), § 703(a)(2), 86 Stat. 103, 109
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a)(2) (1988)). This change was never made to the
ADEA. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
222. An interpretive memorandum on Title VII, introduced into the Congressional
Record by Senators Clark and Case, the Senate floor managers for Title VII, clearly
explained that the proposed Civil Rights Act prohibited only practices in which an
employer segregates or classifies employees "on the basis of" race, religion, sex, or national
origin. 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (1964). This shows a congressional intent to outlaw
intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) rather than treatment neutral on its face
which nonetheless has a discriminatory effect (disparate impact). Therefore, if Title VII
§ 703(a)(2) did not intend to authorize disparate impact, the ADEA's parallel provision,
ADEA § 4(a)(2) could not have been intended to authorize disparate impact either. Krop,
supra note 66, at 844.
223. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
224. See Krop, supra note 66, at 842-44; see also supra notes 139-49 and accompanying
text (discussing weakness of relying on similarities between statutory language of Title VII
and the ADEA).
225. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
226. See Krop, supra note 66, at 850.
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restricting the statutory limit of coverage to age 65 (and then to 70
before removing the upper age limit altogether), 7 and by allowing
age-based decisions when age is a bona fide occupational
qualification.' Furthermore, a present correlation between age and
ability is also different because it is not a result of lifelong
discrimination, but instead arises over time, often combining with a
physical determination. 9
This review of the rationale behind the Supreme Court's creation
of disparate impact theory demonstrates that the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals misconstrued the ADEA in Geller v. Markham when it
decided that the defendant employer's refusal to hire the plaintiff
violated the ADEA under a disparate impact theory of age
discrimination2 3 ° In Geller v. Markham, 3' a school district faced
budget cuts, and determined it could no longer afford to pay for
experience 32 Because experience is generally correlated with age,
the cost-cutting measure had a disparate impact on older workers. 3
While this is certainly an unfortunate consequence, these older
workers had not suffered from lifelong discrimination, and this
discrimination was not a product of invidious stereotypes and hatred,
but simply a matter of economic decisions made during hard
times.' This viewpoint is expressed forcefully in then-Justice
Rehnquist's dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari to Geller:
[This policy of the school board] by its express terms makes
no reference to age and.., has had a significant impact on
teachers under the age of 40 as well as those over that age.
The Court of Appeals' opinion manages to tie the hands of
local school boards in dealing with ever-increasing costs
without the sanction of the [ADEA] which Congress passed
to protect older workers.... [T]he differential based on
227. See supra note 28.
228. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
229. Krop, supra note 66, at 850. For a complete discussion of the importance of the
Griggs decision in differentiating between age and Title VIrs protected classes, see infra
notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
230. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1030.
233. Id. at 1032-33.
234. See, e.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Parker's policy of linking wages to experience is an economically defensible and
reasonable means of determining salaries.").
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experience in [the school board's policy] has nothing to do
with age....
4. Recent Legislative History: 1991 Civil Rights Act
The argument against applying disparate impact theory to the
ADEA is strengthened even more by the 1991 Civil Rights Act [1991
CRA], 6 the most recent congressional action affecting employment
discrimination litigation. After the Wards Cove decision had
potentially eliminated any disparate impact analysis under Title VII,
Congress showed its disagreement with the Supreme Court by
enacting section 105 of the 1991 CRA to codify disparate impact
analysis as a theory of recovery under Title VII. 7  Yet while
Congress was amending Title VII to incorporate disparate impact
theory, Congress failed to amend the ADEA similarly despite the fact
that a relationship between Title VII and the ADEA was perceived
by Congress prior to the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights
Act. 8  Congress did not codify the theory under the ADEA even
though the ADEA was amended in other respects at that time.2 9
235. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945,948-49 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
236. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp.
V 1993) and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
237. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text; see also 1 EGLIT, supra note 19, §
7.51, at 7-305 ("The [1991] CRA ... is object demonstration of Congress' perception of
Wards Cove as for the most part being a flawed decision."); Eglit, supra note 107, at 1174
("In light of Congress' obvious intense concern about Wards Cove... and given further
the long kinship between the ADEA and Title VII, it just does not sit well.., to unreflec-
tively credit Congress' silence as amounting to nothing more than inattention or ignorance
.... "). The vetoed predecessor of the 1991 Amendments explicitly reflected this
perception in its text. Senate Bill 2104, § 2(b) stated that among the purposes of the bill
was to "respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions [including Wards Cove] by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."
Cong. Rec. S. 9966 (1990).
238. Eglit, supra note 107, at 1172; see also 1 EGLrr, supra note 19, § 7.51, at 7-306
("[While it was amending Title VII,] Congress left the ADEA untouched, even though it
had to have known of the regular, repeated practice of ADEA courts relying on Title VII
rulings.").
239. Section 115 of the CRA modified the statutes of limitations that had previously
applied to the filing of private lawsuits under § 7(e) of the ADEA by eliminating the two-
or three-year statutes of limitations that formerly existed under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §
626(e) (Supp. V 1993). In their place Congress enacted a requirement identical to that
which exists under Title VII, so that under both statutes, a civil action may be brought
within 90 days of receiving notification of the EEOC's completion of its investigation. See
29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994). Therefore, Congress
was not only amending the ADEA and Title VII in the same effort, but was specifically
amending a part of the ADEA to match part of Title VII. This unmistakably shows
Congress' understanding of the relationship between the ADEA and Title VII. See also
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This congressional inaction and the non-inclusion of the ADEA in
section 105 of the 1991 CRA indicate that Congress intended
disparate impact theory to be applied only to Title VII cases and not
to age discrimination cases under the ADEA. 4°
Congress' failure to include the ADEA in its explicit adoption of
disparate impact theory in the 1991 CRA was recently heavily relied
upon in Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Authority,24' where the
district court held that "disparate impact is not a cognizable claim
under the ADEA. ' 42  After considering many of the arguments
concerning the inconsistencies between the theory and the language,
purpose and legislative history of the ADEA, the court held that it
was "significant that Congress has not sanctioned disparate impact
under the ADEA."243  After pointing out that section 105 of the
Civil Rights Act amended Title VII explicitly to list the types of
discrimination cases where disparate impact is proper, the Martincic
court concluded that, "Congress' recent decision to include disparate
impact in Title VII claims based on race, color, religion, sex and
Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1434-35 (D. Wyo. 1994) ("The [employers]
bolster their argument [against the applicability of disparate impact] by noting that
Congress did in fact amend certain portions of the ADEA as part of the 1991 amendments
... [and] that Congress' failure to include the codification of the disparate impact theory
was a conscious omission ....").
240. See Moberly, supra note 160, at 90 n.7. As Donald Livingston has pointed out,
one can see that the amendment of § 105 was of a limited scope by comparing the change
in § 105 that addressed Wards Cove to the change in § 108 which overruled Martin v.
Wilks, 409 U.S. 775 (1989), and extended to any "claim of employment discrimination
under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws." Donald R. Livingston, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION 1993, supra note 65, at 143, 156. Because of this limited change to § 105, a
number of courts have held that the 1991 CRA does not apply to cases under the ADEA.
See Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 1337,1348-49 (D.N.J. 1992) ("Congress
did ... amend the ADEA in certain sections of the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] ... and,
therefore, the decision to limit the scope of [other sections] to Title VII is significant."),
affd, 993 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1993); cf. Morgan v. Servicemaster Co. Ltd. Partnership, 57
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423,1424 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (declining to extend the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amending Title VII's damage provisions to ADEA cases);
Guillory-Wuerz v. Brady, 785 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Colo. 1992) (declining to "look to the
new amendments affecting Title VII for guidance in ADEA litigation"). If the 1991 CRA
does not apply, Wards Cove may still be applicable to ADEA cases. See Livingston, supra,
at 156 (citing Rebar v. Marsh, 959 F.2d 216 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that Congress' failure
to include a venue provision in the ADEA similar to the one contained in Title VII should
be corrected by Congress, not the courts)); see also supra notes 102-07 and accompanying
text (considering the continuing applicability of Wards Cove to the ADEA after the
passage of the 1991 CRA).
241. 844 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
242. Id. at 1076-77.
243. Id. at 1077.
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national origin, but not to suggest disparate impact analysis for age in
the ADEA, or elsewhere, was not an oversight."2'
While there is a school of thought that congressional silence and
inaction should not be construed to imply acquiescence or
agreement,245 it'seems unrealistic to say that Congress, while amen-
ding Title VII, never recognized the possibility that such changes
would have some effect on the ADEA.2 6 Congress was obviously
aware of the perceived harmful effects that Wards Cove had on
employment discrimination law-that is one of the reasons it enacted
the 1991 CRA to amend Title VII. Yet disparate impact theory was
not incorporated into the other employment discrimination act-the
ADEA. To argue that Congress was not aware of the ADEA as it
crafted the 1991 CRA is to ignore the fact that Congress amended the
ADEA by that very same 1991 Civil Rights Act.247 Overlooking
congressional inaction under these circumstances is improper, even for
the harshest critic of Congress.
C. Differences Between Age and Title VII's Protected Classes
Finally, in addition to the differences between the statutory
language and legislative histories of the ADEA and Title VII,
disparate impact theory should also not be applied to the ADEA
because there are clear, substantive differences between age and Title
Vii's protected classes of race, religion, national origin and gender.
The two basic differences are: (1) while Title VII's protected classes
and ability are unrelated, age and ability are at least at some point
inherently linked; and (2) age discrimination is based on stereotypes,
not malevolence, and has a history distinct from that found among
Title VII's protected classes. There are simply too many differences
between the class of persons forty and older and the classes protected
by Title VII to incorporate into the former a theory created for the
latter. While disparate impact may be a "necessary tool to root out
the pervasive legacy of racism... it [is] unnecessary and impractical
244. Id- at 1078.
245. Those who argue against finding affirmative implications in congressional inaction
suggest that it is just as possible that Congress simply never recognized the potential
impact of their inaction. For a comprehensive discussion of the significance of legislative
silence, see Eglit, supra note 107, at 1172-1202.
246. See Eglit, supra note 107, at 1173-75.
247. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp.
V. 1993) and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Congress amended the ADEA to provide
the same statute of limitations and "right to sue" notification procedure under the ADEA
as under Title VII.
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for addressing the less invidious problem of discrimination based onage ,,248
1. The Correlation Between Age and Ability to Work
First, "[u]nlike with other subject areas of discrimination where
there is no correlation whatsoever between the protected class and the
ability to perform, with age there is a direct correlation at some
point." 49  Simply put, unlike race, religion, gender, or national
origin, "at some point in almost everyone's life, age affects the ability
to work."' ' The ADEA was intended to protect only workers who
had reached an age where they were susceptible to age discrimination
but whose individual abilities were not affected by their age '
Both the fact that the ADEA was originally limited to workers
between the ages of forty and sixty-five, 2 and the stated purpose
of the ADEAP3 recognize that age can affect the ability to work.
The ADEA even sets a goal of having employers and employees
work together to resolve the "real" difficulties cansed by aging3P
2. Age Discrimination Has a Unique Impetus and History
Second, age discrimination itself is a different beast than the
discrimination Title VII sought to eradicate.P Age is not an
248. Kaminshine, supra note 3, at 287.
249. Michael I. Bernstein, Disparate Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION WORKSHOP 1985:
STATE AND FEDERAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, at 411, 413.
250. Harris, supra note 125, at 716, accord Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 121 (1979)
("[A]ge, unlike sex, is at some point likely to bear a relationship to ability.").
251. See Harris, supra note 125, at 716-17. One commentator makes the point that
Congress recognized the relationship between age and ability and therefore "did not ban
age discrimination with the unequivocal, broad-brush strokes with which it banned racial
discrimination." Stacy, supra note 125, at 445.
252. See supra note 28.
253. See ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988). "It is therefore the purpose of this
chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
Id. (emphasis added).
254. See Harris, supra note 125, at 717.
255. Some argue that the discrimination faced by older Americans deserves the same
effort at eradication that is embodied in Title VII. They claim that "[d]iscrimination based
on age.., can be as great an evil in our society as discrimination based on race or religion
or any other characteristic which ignores a person's unique status as an individual and
treats him or her as a member of some arbitrarily-defined group." Ramirez v. Puerto Rico
Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694,699 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454
F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[A]ge discrimination, while often more subtle than
race or sex discrimination, is equally pernicious."), affd in part and rev'd and remanded
in part, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979). But even if one agrees with these characterizations
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immutable characteristic such as race, sex or national origin, since age
changes over time. Older persons have faced no lifelong bias-any
bias that arises does so only later in life. 6 In fact, those who are
victims of age discrimination as older workers may have benefitted
when they were younger from such discrimination against other older
workers. That age discrimination can bring benefits and is not
invidious clearly differentiates it from racial discrimination, or
discrimination due to Title VII's other protected characteristics. 7
Discrimination against persons due to their age is generally not based
on bigotry or hatred, but rather it is due to stereotypes attached to
older persons and assumptions about their abilities as employees.2"
Furthermore, in addition t distinctions between the types of
discrimination the different classes currently face, the history of that
discrimination in our country also greatly differs.
The concept of preventing the perpetuation of past discrimination
is central to the Griggs Court's decision to establish disparate impact
theory. 9 Disparate impact applies under Title VII because the
individuals in its protected categories have suffered from historical
of age discrimination, this does not support the application of disparate impact to the
ADEA because the ADEA is not a statutory attempt to rid the workplace of all age
discrimination. The ADEA attempts to fight only arbitrary age discrimination, and by
allowing age to be used in a discriminatory manner under certain circumstances, the
legislation itself bares the policy decision that age discrimination will be tolerated in certain
situations. This is a stark contrast to Title VII's effort to rid the workplace of all racial,
gender, or ethnic discrimination.
256. Supporters of applying disparate impact to the ADEA argue that the fact that
older persons are "old" only for part of their lives does not lessen the discrimination they
face in these years. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1061. The fact that a Mexican-American
has only recently arrived in this country does not reduce the prejudice that she faces once
she has arrived. Id. at 1061 n.96. Whether racially or ethnically motivated or based on
age, once the discrimination begins, an individual is judged by the stereotypes attached to
the class in which she is grouped, regardless of her own individual characteristics. Id. at
1061.
But even if this is true, it entirely misses the point. Supporters argue that disparate
impact theory should be grafted onto the ADEA simply because all discrimination is bad,
and any method used to fight discrimination in Title VII should be universally applied.
But the very differences between the characteristic of age, which leads to employment
discrimination only later in life, and Title VI's categories, to which discrimination adheres
at birth, prove that what is appropriate for one statute does not automatically fit the other.
As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted, while this may "create[] a
'practical difficulty,' it is a result dictated by the statute itself." EEOC v. Francis W.
Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994).
257. See Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that age
discrimination is qualitatively different from race or gender discrimination).
258. Yarbrough, supra note 194, at 114.
259. Krop, supra note 66, at 848.
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discrimination and prejudicial stereotypes. ° Because the aged have
not been subject to the type of invidious discrimination associated
with race (which led to the Court's recognition of the need for
disparate impact analysis in Griggs), there is less reason to require the
employer to justify every employment practice that disproportionately
affects older workers.2' Unlike in Griggs, employer decisions
responding to a changing business climate that have a disparate
impact on older workers are not translating past discrimination against
older Americans into present disabilities. The policy considerations
that inspired the Griggs Court to hold the theory implied in Title VII
are not present under the ADEA.26 In essence,
Griggs was predicated on the assumption that blacks and
whites are inherently equal in ability and that, but for
historical discrimination, they would be equally well situated
in employment.... Similar assumptions cannot be made for
all other protected groups. Indeed, some-such as the aged
260. See Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1432-33 (D. Wyo. 1994). "[I]t is
clear that Griggs' adoption of the disparate impact theory was grounded in the fear of
allowing employers' workforces to remain stagnant and discriminatory in composition with
respect to certain groups ... [that had] been subjected to an empirically documented
history of overt societal discrimination .... ." Id.
261. Krop, supra note 66, at 852; see also Stacy, supra note 125, at 440 ("[O]lder
workers have not suffered ... [the] hostility and lack of concern occasioned by racial
difference[s which was] the 'historic evil of national proportions' at which Title VII was
directed.").
262. Some argue that even if age discrimination is a different type of discrimination,
and even if older Americans have not faced the historical, invidious, social stereotyping
faced by racial minorities and women, this is not critical to applying disparate impact
analysis to the ADEA because the Supreme Court's theory of disparate impact begun with
Griggs is neither tied to nor based on past discrimination. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1056-
57. They stress that "Congress directed the thrust of the [anti-discrimination statutes] to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971). They argue that when the Court expanded disparate
impact to other Title VII protected categories, it did so without recognition of the decades
of discrimination the groups had faced, but simply based on the adverse effects the
employment policies in question had on members of the protected class. Ziegler, supra
note 10, at 1057-59. They note that in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), where
the Supreme Court invalidated a minimum height and weight requirement for prison
guards because of the requirement's disparate impact on female applicants, the Court's
ruling did not include any discussion of past discrimination. Ziegler, supra note 10, at
1057-59. But the "concept of perpetuating past discrimination [was] central to the Griggs
rationale," Krop, supra note 66, at 848, and even the Dothard decision, while not
specifically repeating the logic used in Griggs, did note that the reasoning employed in
Griggs "guide[s] our approach here." Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
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..-- may be protected, in part, because they are likelyas
groups to be less qualified for employment than others.O
A recent example of a court using precisely this analysis to
conclude that disparate impact does not apply under the ADEA can
be found in Hiatt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.' In Hiatt, the
plaintiffs contended that the employer's mandatory promotion policy
violated the ADEA under a disparate impact theory because the
policy required employees to change positions, which resulted in a
loss of seniority for the promoted worker.2" The Hiatt court ruled
that "an employment practice which disproportionately falls on older
individuals, standing alone, [does] not... give rise to an inference or
presumption of unlawful [age] discrimination ... [and] disparate
impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA as a matter of
law."' 66 The main factors behind this decision were two-fold: First,
the court found that the concept of perpetuating past discrimination
was the central rationale behind the Griggs decision, and this concern
is "not present when the alleged disparate impact is based on
age."'267 Second, the court found that there was some correlation
between age and ability, and that this correlation could not be "traced
to... past discrimination against these [plaintiffs] who were previous-
ly younger and possibly the beneficiaries of any age
discrimination."2" Therefore, the Hiatt court held that disparate
impact theory was not applicable to claims of age discrimination
brought under the ADEA.269
The difference between age and Title VII's protected classes is
further highlighted by the fact that age classifications are not
considered a suspect class-as race classifications are-under the
263. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 947, 948 n.1 (1982).
264. 859 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Wyo. 1994).
265. Id. at 1423.
266. Id. at 1436.
267. Id. at 1435-36. The Hiatt court reinforced this point by holding that "it is apparent
that the underpinnings of Griggs simply have no application when the alleged
discrimination is based on age." Id. at 1436.
268. Id. at 1436.
269. Id. Even though the district court recognized that the statutory language might
offer a possible interpretation for applying the theory, it decided that it was necessary to
"look beyond the plain language of the statute" to reach a conclusion. Id. at 1434. Also,
the court refused to give much weight to Congress' failure to codify disparate impact
theory under the ADEA when it enacted the 1991 CRA. Id. at 1434-35. Nonetheless, the
court's review of Griggs was enough for it to decide that disparate impact theory should
not apply under the ADEA. Id. at 1435-36.
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Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.' In Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia,27' the Supreme Court held that age-
based classifications were subject only to a rational relation test.272
Therefore, the Court upheld a state mandatory retirement law for
state troopers, reasoning:
While the treatment of the aged ... has not been wholly
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who
have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin, have not experienced a "history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not
truly indicative of their abilities.... [G1ld age does not
define a "discrete and insular" group, in need of "extrao-
rdinary protection" [because age merely] marks a stage that
each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.
The Murgia Court in essence recognized that not only was age
discrimination different from the discrimination addressed by Title
VII, but that age, unlike race or gender, "is often a relevant indicator
of job performance and is not a completely inapposite stereotype with
no correlation to job performance."'27
The most recent United States Supreme Court decision involving
the ADEA, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,.7 5 also provides support for
the inapplicability of disparate impact theory to the ADEA.276 In
270. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person ... the
equal protection of the laws"). While a thorough discussion of equal protection analysis
and the different levels of scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Comment, the comparison
of the treatment of age as opposed to race further elucidates the differences between the
policies behind the ADEA and Title VII.
271. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
272. Id. at 312. Under a rational relation test, a law will be upheld if it is rationally
related to a legitimate government objective. Id.
273. Id, at 313-14 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938)).
274. Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1436 (D. Wyo. 1994) (applying the
Supreme Court's decision in Murgia).
275. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
276. The Court granted certiorari in Hazen Paper to resolve a split among the federal
circuit courts over whether age-correlated employment decisions, such as decisions based
on employee pension benefits, could be equated with unlawful age discrimination. 1992-93
Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 35 B.C. L. REv. 349, 524 (1994). The
First, Third, and Seventh Circuits had held that such decisions could not be analytically
distinguished from age discrimination because such benefits were so inextricably linked
with age. See White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that firing a worker to prevent vesting of pension violates the ADEA because pension
benefits are "inextricably linked" to an employee's years of service and thus are linked to
his or her age and because there is a close practical link between pension benefits,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Hazen Paper, the Court considered an ADEA claim brought by
Biggins, a 62-year-old plaintiff who had been fired just days before his
pension would have vested under the terms of the company pension
plan which provided for vesting after ten years of working for the
employer.' The Court held that since the ADEA's purpose is to
eradicate demeaning, stereotypical biases, when an employer fires an
employee because of salary level, pension benefits, or any other factor
correlated to age, it does not necessarily indicate the employer
harbors forbidden views about older people 8 The Hazen Court
said:
The employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an
employee's remaining characteristics, such as productivity,
but must instead focus on those factors directly.
When the employer's decision is wholly motivated by
factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and
stigmatizing stereotypes disappears. This is true even if the
motivating factor is correlated with age, as pension status
typically is.279
seniority, and age); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1210 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
that firing higher-paid, more senior employees to save salary costs violates the ADEA
because allowing such economic discrimination would undermine the policies of the
ADEA); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that employment decisions based upon an employee's unpaid pension benefits
would constitute age discrimination), affd in par4 rev'd and remanded in part, 608 F.2d.
1369 (2d Cir. 1979) (opinion unpublished). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits had reached the
opposite conclusions, holding that decisions made on such factors were analytically distinct
from age discrimination. See EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942-43 (4th Cir.
1992) (finding that no connection exists between age and length of service of an employee,
so pensions and other benefits based on years of service are not connected to age for
purposes of interpreting the ADEA); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130
n.17 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that seniority and age are unrelated for purposes of ADEA
claims, and employers who discriminate only upon arguably "age-related" factors do not
violate the ADEA), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). The Hazen Paper Court adopted
the view of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1705.
277. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
278. Id. at 1706. As the Court further explained, it is possible that "an employer who
targets employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that these employees
are likely to be older" violates the ADEA. Id. at 1707. But the Court said that the use
of this type of "proxy" does not violate the ADEA just because under the statute the two
factors (here age and pension status) are equivalent; the ADEA is violated only if it is
shown that the employer both assumes a correlation between the two factors where none
exists and acts on that assumption. Id As the Hazen Court understood it, the question
is: Did the employer use a "prohibited stereotype" in making its employment decision by
thinking that " 'older employees are likely to _ ' " Id. In Hazen, the Court found
that the employer did not ask itself such a question concerning Biggins. Id.
279. Id. at 1706.
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The Hazen Court held that because "an employee's age is analytically
distinct from his years of service.., an employer can take account of
one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a
decision based on years of service is necessarily 'age-based.' "I
Finally, the Court said that while the ADEA "requires the employer
to ignore an employee's age (absent a statutory exemption or
defense) it does not specify further characteristics -that an employer
must also ignore."'" After Hazen, an ADEA plaintiff must show
that the rationale behind an employer's employment decision (if one
is offered) is pretextual and that the employment policy is predicated
on some stereotype, conscious or unconscious. Employers will not
violate the ADEA merely by interfering with an older worker's
pension benefits or factors other than age, unless a clear connection
is made between such an interference and discrimination based on the
employee's age.'
Since Hazen was a disparate treatment case, and disparate impact
theory was not at issue,' some argue that the door remains open
for employees within the ADEA's protection to try to use disparate
impact theory to hold employers liable under the ADEA if they
discriminate on the basis of pension, seniority or other "age-related"
benefits.' However, even while the Court recognized that the
plaintiff had not raised a disparate impact claim, the Court's language
shows tremendous skepticism about including a disparate impact
theory under the ADEA. The Court specifically held that
"[d]isparate treatment ... captures the essence of what Congress
sought to prohibit in the ADEA,"' thus implying a belief that
disparate impact theory is not what the ADEA intended. Further,
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Rehnquist signalled their willingness
280. Id. at 1707.
281. Id.
282. The Court did note, however, that the employer's action in firing Biggins to
prevent his pension benefits from vesting would be actionable under § 510 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [ERISA], 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). Id.
at 1707.
283. Plaintiff Biggins did not raise a disparate impact claim; he relied on an allegation
of disparate treatment. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1706 ("[Plaintiff] claims only that he
received disparate treatment.").
284. For an argument that the Court should find that disparate impact theory
appropriately extends to ADEA claims resulting from termination to prevent pension
benefits from vesting, see Patricia A. Mitchell, Note, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins:
Extending the Disparate Impact Doctrine to ADEA Claims, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 675, 685-93
(1994).
285. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.
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to hold disparate impact theory expressly inapplicable to the
ADEA.2
The effects of the Hazen decision are dramatically illustrated in
a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School,' a case with facts strikingly
similar to those at issue in Geller v. Markham, the Court of
Appeals used the logic of the Hazen decision (as well as much of the
opinion's language) to hold that disparate impact theory was not
applicable under the ADEA. The Francis Parker School
District's policy of linking wages to experience was adjudged an
economically defensible and reasonable means of determining
salaries.'90 The Seventh Circuit panel held that although years of
service may be correlated with age, Hazen holds that "it is incorrect
to say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily age-
based," unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the reason given was
a pretext for a stereotype-based rationale.29 The Francis Parker
court used the Hazen decision as overwhelming proof that disparate
impact doctrine should not be applied to the ADEA, and the Seventh
Circuit's decision might spur on the Supreme Court to address the
issue directly in the near future.29
286. See supra note 120.
287. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
288. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
289. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077. The Francis W. Parker Sch. decision
overruled the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202,
1204 (7th Cir. 1987), in which the court applied disparate impact theory to the ADEA.
This reversal was seemingly foreshadowed in the court's previous term. See Anderson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that employment decisions
based on criteria which merely tend to affect workers over the age of 40 more adversely
than workers under 40 are not prohibited).
290. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1078. The court held that this was "borne out
by the ADEA's 'safe harbor' provision which permits an employer to 'observe the terms
of a bona fide seniority system ... which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the
ADEA's prohibitions].' " Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)) (1988), amended by 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(2)(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
291. Id
292. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Hazen signals that at least three members of the
Court, Justices Kennedy and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, would hold that
disparate impact should not apply under the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113
S. Ct. 1701, 1710 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra note 120.
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3. The Realities of the Workplace
The differences between the ADEA and Title VII are brought
into even clearer focus by looking at the reality of the workplace. As
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted,
The progression of age is a universal human process. In the
very nature of the problem, it is apparent that in the usual
case, absent any discriminatory intent, discharged employees
will more often than not be replaced by those younger than
they, for older employees are constantly moving out of the
labor market, while younger ones move in.... [W]e do not
believe that Congress intended automatic presumptions to
apply whenever a worker is replaced by another of a
different age.'
Furthermore, statistics, often the key to disparate impact cases, may
be less probative in age cases because of this natural progression in
the workplace, whereby older workers retire and younger workers
replace them.294 Therefore, statistics tending to show that older
workers are being replaced by younger workers, taken alone, would
at best be extremely tenuous evidence of age discrimination, and any
showing of a statistical disparity may receive less weight in an ADEA
case than it would under Title VII.295 But since statistics are the
linchpin of disparate impact claims, this inherent conflict between the
293. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975).
294. See Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (incorporating by reference and appending the opinion of the district court
judge) (citing Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 313), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); see also Outten,
supra note 65, at 166-67 ("Natural factors... such as the normal predominance of younger
workers entering the workforce, and older ones leaving, tend to skew the statistics, making
age disparate impact cases rarer than they are in other EEO areas.").
295. See, e.g., Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting a decreasing average employee age as probative of age discrimination); Moore
v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1031 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that because factors
unique to age "[tend] to negate the probative value of [statistical] evidence [of age
discrimination], statistics might not be reliable to indicate" an ADEA violation); Kephart,
630 F.2d at 1224 (stating that no adverse impact caused by employment decisions is legally
significant unless it is great enough to offset the normal progression of older workers out
of the labor force, and their replacement by younger workers); see also Sholl & Strang,
supra note 68, at 338 ("It is difficult ... to determine when the degree of any disparate
impact becomes legally significant .... [Since s]ome disparity is always present, and [this
disparity] simply reflects the replacement of older workers by younger workers, as older
workers retire from the labor force."); cf Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp.
1299, 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (stating that age discrimination is not identical to either race
or sex discrimination, so the same principles governing the use of statistics in those types
of cases should not be applied across the board to an age case).
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functioning of disparate impact theory and the realities of the real
labor market illustrate another inherent flaw in trying to include
disparate impact theory under the ADEA.
4. Enforcement History and Reverse Discrimination
Two further distinctions between the ADEA and Title VII
support the argument that disparate impact theory should not be
applied to the ADEA. First, enforcement of the ADEA originally
was assigned to the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor, not to the EEOC, which enforced Title VII.296 The
interpretation originally issued by the Wage and Hour Ad-ministrator297 did not support the notion that the ADEA was
directed at disparate impact."ag Eventually, the responsibility for
enforcing the ADEA was shifted to the EEOC z9 but this initial
difference is just one more indication that while Congress' original
intention in passing the ADEA may have had much in common with
Title VII, the two statutes were never intended to be identical.3
Second, unlike Title VII, the ADEA does not protect plaintiffs
outside the protected class from reverse discrimination: employers
may favor older workers over non-protected workers because
Congress in the ADEA specifically sought to protect a group-older
workers.3' 1  These two differences between Title VII and the
ADEA are further evidence that the application of disparate impact
theory to the ADEA would be inappropriate.
296. Ziegler, supra note 10, at 1048 n.46.
297. 33 Fed. Reg. 9172 (June 21, 1968) (codified as 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1983)).
298. See Stacy, supra note 125, at 447-48. The original interpretive regulations show
concern only over assuring that practices, such as the posting of help wanted notices, 29
C.F.R. § 860.92(d) (1983) and employee testing, 29 C.F.R. § 860.104(b) (1983), are "for a
permissible purpose and not for purposes proscribed by the [ADEA]." 29 C.F.R. § 860
(1983).
299. The responsibilities for enforcing the ADEA were transferred from the
Department of Labor to the EEOC, effective January 1, 1979, by President Carter's
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978,3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1366
(1988), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
300. One commentator has argued that the assignment of the ADEA's enforcement to
the Department of Labor was done not as an indication of any difference from Title VII,
but as a realistic recognition that the EEOC may be overburdened. See Anne S. Emanuel,
Comment, Class Actions Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Question
Is "Why Not?", 23 EMORY LJ. 831,838 (1974) (noting that the enforcement responsibility
of the ADEA was originally different to ensure that it did not receive short shrift at the
hands of an overloaded EEOC).
301. Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992).
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5. Unintended Effects of Applying Disparate Impact Theory to
the ADEA
Finally, stepping back from the details and intricacies of the
language and history of the ADEA and Title VII, a critical policy
implication is involved when considering disparate impact theory and
the ADEA. Time has shown that the main beneficiaries of the
ADEA are white males in their fifties and sixties °2 This same
group has also been the traditional beneficiary of both historic de jure
discrimination and past and current de facto discrimination against
women and minorities. Despite legislation and changing attitudes,
discrimination against women and minorities still exists, and the
effects of past discrimination continue to be difficult to completely
overcome. Applying disparate impact theory to the ADEA would
provide the older white male worker with one more tool to slow the
progress of ensuring equal employment opportunities and equal
treatment for minorities and women?' Even if this is an entirely
unintended result, Title VII and the ADEA were designed to
complement each other.3 Offering a greater chance for recovery
under the ADEA at the expense of continuing the oppression of
minority groups is an undesirable clash. Such a conflicting effect
offers one more practical reason for not applying disparate impact
theory to the ADEA.
V. THE EFFECr OF APPLYING OR NOT APPLYING DISPARATE
IMPACr THEORY TO THE ADEA
As illustrated in the preceding sections, disparate impact theory,
as developed under Title VII, should not be applied to the ADEA
because the ADEA has its own unique language, history and goals,
302. "[T]he typical plaintiff in an age-related lawsuit is a male in his early or mid-50's
who has been with the company 20 years or more and has worked up through the ranks
of middle management." Steven Pressman, Older Workers Enforce Their Rights With
Lawsuits, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 17,1989, at 1C. Theories as to why ADEA litigants
seem to fit this profile focus on a number of interconnected factors including: (1) white
males continue to occupy jobs that are most rewarding in terms of salary and power, and
thus they have greater reason to fight the loss of such a position; and (2) since white males
are often higher salaried employees, they are more likely to have the resources to fight via
litigation. See 1 EGLIT, supra note 19, § 2.01, at 2-4.
303. Alfred Blumrosen, Book Review, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 186, 192-93 (1981).
"The primary beneficiaries of the ADEA are white males in their fifties and sixties....
To give them the benefit of [disparate impact] principle will inevitably slow the process of
affirmative action for minorities and women." Id.
304. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
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and because age discrimination is distinct from other areas of
employment discrimination. Furthermore, these distinctions are also
supported by analyzing the current status of age discrimination
litigation and the real thought processes that go through the minds of
parties to a lawsuit brought under the ADEA.
The application of disparate impact to the ADEA would be a
drastic step because it would suddenly open up a new avenue for
recovery in those jurisdictions that currently limit an ADEA claim
only to disparate treatment theory. Moreover, because being able to
establish a prima facie case with statistics that show an adverse
impact, and thereby shifting the burden of proof to the employer,
dramatically alters the potential parties' strategies and postures in any
lawsuit, such a step would be a sea change in age discrimination
litigation. The very nature of employment litigation makes the
placement of the burden of proof critical to the explosion or
implosion of age discrimination suits.
Initially, most employers are loathe to take age discrimination
suits to trial. First, between two-thirds and three-quarters of plaintiffs
who go to trial in ADEA cases win before a jury. 5 Second, all
trials are expensive and time-consuming.3 °6 Third, taking a case to
trial, rather than reaching a settlement, may expose the employer to
huge liability. Fourth, the publicity and tension caused by a
public trial may have a negative impact on the employer's
305. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Debate Goes On; Ex-Official Gives
EEOC Mixed Review, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 17, 1992, at A2 (quoting an interview with
Charles Shanor, former General Counsel to the EEOC) [hereinafter Ex-Official Gives
EEOC Mixed Review].
306. For example, while McDonnell Douglas Co. said it based its layoffs on
performance ratings, not age, in March, 1993, the company agreed to pay $20.1 million to
a group of plaintiffs in an age discrimination action to "avoid costly and time-consuming
litigation." The settlement was the second largest in EEOC history. Aaron Epstein,
Charges of Age Bias Rise as Companies Pare Ranks, MIAMI HERALD, May 16,1993, at 1K.
307. "Sympathetic jurors generally award larger damages in age discrimination suits
than in other types of discrimination suits.... [D]amage awards in age bias cases, on
average, run twice the awards in race bias cases. .. ." Doming, supra note 10, § 1, at 10.
Ore survey found that from 1988 through 1992, successful age discrimination claims
brought average awards of $450,289, compared with $255,734 for sex discrimination,
$176,578 for race discrimination, and $151,421 for disability discrimination. lad (citing
survey by Jury Verdict Research, Horsham, Pa.). Total damage awards in age
discrimination cases tripled from 1988 to 1993, reaching a total of $96.9 million for 1993.
Witt, supra note 17, at 8F.
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business,"' the morale of other employees, and the community's
view of the participants.
Moreover, litigators are rightly fearful of age discrimination suits
tried before a jury." First, the suits often look like the classic case
of the bully (the employer) treating the helpless "little guy" (the
employee or applicant) poorly and trying to get away with it. 10
Second, unlike cases under Title VII where jurors are asked to
consider the plight of members of different protected classes subject
to discrimination, almost all jurors can sympathize with the plight of
the ADEA plaintiff..' While not all jurors can truly understand
what it is like to be a racial minority or to be of a different gender,
all jurors hope to be in the plaintiff's situation one day-to be lucky
enough to grow old-and therefore, they empathize with the ADEA
plaintiff more easily than a victim of discrimination from any other
protected class.
3 12
A decision on this issue will also dramatically affect any attempts
at settlement of age discrimination suits. For example, since proof of
an employer's discriminatory motive is hard to show, many disparate
treatment cases are won by employers on motions for summary
judgment. 3 But under a disparate impact claim, motions for
308. See Epstein, supra note 306, at 1K (stating that despite the fact that some lawsuits
alleging age bias are frivolous, since there are certainly some workers who show actual
lethargy or resist change, "a fear of lawsuits often deters employers from firing
unproductive older workers").
309. See Cooper, supra note 19, at IF ("Age [discrimination in employment lawsuits]
are far more likely to be successful than race or sex cases.").
310. See id. ("Juries usually view [age discrimination in employment] cases as a
mismatch, 'old Uncle Charlie versus Acme Conglomerate Corp.' ").
311. Pressman, supra note 302, at 1C ("[O]lder jury members are more likely to be
sympathetic to an older worker charging an employer with age discrimination. But the
same logic can be easily extended to younger jurors.... They're going to be older people
some day."); see also Cooper, supra note 19, at IF (stating that older jurors tend to better
identify and sympathize with older workers claiming age discrimination); Doming, supra
note 10, § 1, at 10 (noting that "jurors tend to be older than the general population,
because older people register to vote in larger numbers and older citizens are less inclined
to resist jury service when called").
312. See Doming, supra note 10, § 1, at 10 ("We're all going to get old. We're not all
going to get African-American [or] handicapped.").
313. It has been stated that "many defense counsel view the motion for summary
judgment as the most important phase of the [age discrimination] case because if the case
reaches a jury, the chances of the employer prevailing decrease." Thomas J. Piskorski, The
Growing Judicial Acceptance of Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination Cases, 18
EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 245, 246 (1992); see also Jeffery S. Brand, Summary Judgment
Motions in Age Discrimination in Employment Actions: A Plaintiffs Perspective, in AGE
DISCRIMINATION WORKSHOP 1985: STATE AND FEDERAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, at
141, 143 ("While there is language in ... treatises to th[e] effect [that summary judgment
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summary judgment are much easier for the plaintiff to survive.14
This difference is shown perfectly by two recent cases decided in
different federal district courts. Where disparate impact was ruled a
viable theory under the ADEA, the employer's summary judgment
motion was defeated;315 where the theory was not accepted, sum-
mary judgment was granted to the employer.316 -
If disparate impact was a valid theory for recovery, the employer
would know that because a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination via statistics without having to prove
discriminatory animus, the case is much more likely to survive a
summary judgment motion and get to trial. This would alter the
parties' settlement calculus and their own evaluation of the likely cost
of litigation. While lawsuits are expensive and time-consuming, cases
that go to trial are even more so. If disparate impact theory becomes
available, the plaintiffs immediately gain bargaining strength, as well
as an increased likelihood of recovering in a case where before they
could not have won. Though this might make some lawsuits less
contentious, it also makes a suit immediately more expensive for the
employer and will drive settlements higher.
However, it also seems likely that if age discrimination claims
become too easy to win, or settlements become too costly, there will
motions are used sparingly in age discrimination cases], the reality is ... defendant's
motions for summary judgment are frequently granted in age cases and ... boilerplate
propositions regarding their supposed disfavor are of little use in opposing them.");
Gregory, supra note 110, at 418 ("An increasing number of discrimination cases are
resolved at the summary judgment stage. Whether evidence is sufficient to survive
summary judgment has become the critical issue in federal discrimination practice."). For
a criticism of the use of summary judgment to resolve ADEA suits, see Gale Busemeyer,
Comment, Summary Judgment and the ADEA Claimant: Problems and Patterns of Proof,
21 CONN. L. REv. 99, 123-32 (1988).
314. There has been a pronounced increase in the use of summary judgment procedure
in civil rights and employment discrimination litigation. See Gregory, supra note 110, at
425 ("Historically, summary judgment was a rarely used procedural device. More recently,
courts have looked favorably upon the summary disposition of claims .... ."); supra notes
108-19 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of disparate impact theory on burdens
of proof and motions for summary judgment). See generally Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990)
(discussing history and recent trends in the use of summary judgment); Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in
Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993) (discussing recent use of summary
judgment by federal district courts in employment discrimination cases).
315. See Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 38-39 (D. Me. 1993).
316. See Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp 1416, 1436-37 (D. Wyo. 1994).
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be a subtle backlash from employers 7 A business seeking to
survive in difficult economic times tends to find creative ways to cut
costs, and it is likely that discriminatory decisions will still be made;
they will just become more subtle and harder to detect. On the other
hand, if claims of discrimination are too difficult to establish,
employers will have a much wider range within which to make
employment decisions which may impinge on the rights of older
workers, and this would defeat the basic goals of the ADEA itself.
If disparate impact theory is not applied to the ADEA, it is
possible that the eventual impact will be an erosion of the original
congressional intent embodied in the ADEA. The practical reality is
that certain characteristics, such as experience, wages based on
seniority, pension status, and benefits plans, do correlate strongly with
age and can be effectively used as proxies for age-based deter-
minations. If this does not violate the ADEA, then employers will
have a facially valid method for affecting limited "unintentional" age
discrimination in their employment practices. This may result in a
situation where age discrimination in employment is prohibited in
form, but not in substance.
CONCLUSION: ESTABLISHING DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
UNDER THE ADEA WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Even though strong arguments support the position that disparate
impact theory should not be applied to the ADEA, there clearly
remains much sympathy among commentators and courts toward
aiding older employees in actions brought under the ADEA.
Certainly no one would attempt to dispute the negative impacts of age
discrimination, both on the workforce and on individual employees.
But, the ADEA-the statute specifically created to address age
discrimination in employment-is a limited legislative remedy. It is
simply not broad enough to include the concept of disparate impact
within its protections. A clear and final illustration of this is Martincic
v. Urban Redevelopment Authority,318 where an employer chose to
promote a younger worker over an older employee.319 The Martin-
317. See Ex-Official Gives EEOC Mixed Review, supra note 305, at A2 (quoting former
General Counsel of the EEOC, Charles Shanor, who suggests that as plaintiffs gain more
leverage for favorable settlements in employment discrimination suits, defendant employers
may fight the suit harder rather than settling when the cost of settlement becomes too
high).
318. 844 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
319. Id. at 1074.
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cic court held that disparate impact theory must not apply under the
ADEA because if it did, "[when] younger workers happen to be
promoted at a higher rate than older workers, then the plaintiff's
prima facie case for disparate-impact age discrimination is satis-
fied-even though age may not have been considered in the
promotion decisions."3" The court reacted to the plaintiff's claim
of discrimination almost incredulously: "Surely this cannot be age
discrimination, at least not without Congress' imprimatur. 321  No
such congressional intent can be found in the ADEA, and if anything,
the opposite intent was expressed by Congress when it amended Title
VII to incorporate disparate impact theory, but did not similarly
amend the ADEA.3' Finally, the Martincic court was troubled by
the notion of a court's reviewing the employer's business decisions,
absent direct evidence of age bias 3P It considered such a review
"an undue interference in the management of a business. 324
If applying disparate impact theory to the ADEA ever becomes
required to combat the effects of age discrimination in employment,
then Congress, not the courts, should make this policy decision.
Congress could amend the ADEA explicitly to provide for recovery
under a disparate impact theory, or merely to include under the
coverage of the ADEA a prohibition against employers using specific
factors that strongly correlate with age as the basis for employment
decisions." But by taking any action, Congress would be required
320. Md. at 1077. The Martincic court, in its reasoning, hypothetically examined the
employer who uses a promotion policy based solely on merit. Id.
321. Id.
322. I at 1077-78; see supra notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
323. Martincic, 844 F. Supp. at 1077.
324. Id.; see also Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (5th Cir.
1982) ("The ADEA 'was not intended as a vehicle for judicial review of business
decisions.' " (citing Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir.
1980)). This statement echoes the Supreme Court's own caution in Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters that "[c]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it." 438 U.S.
567, 578 (1978).
325. The most plausible, yet still effective action, would consist of Congress amending
the ADEA to allow recovery under a disparate impact theory according to a specific set
level or sliding scale threshold for a showing of disparate impact. Congress could also
declare certain characteristics (such as seniority or pension status) invalid for use in
making employment decisions while allowing employers to use other characteristics (such
as salary or overall employee costs). This would balance the employers' business needs
with the needs of older workers, and this solution would recognize the valid arguments for
extending disparate impact to the ADEA and the drastic changes that such an application
would have on the business community. Such an amendment of the ADEA would
reaffirm Congress' commitment to individual civil rights without losing sight of the real,
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to recognize the attendant effects that policy decision would have on
businesses and employment practices at all levels of the public and
private sector. Therefore, any congressional action seems unlikely,
because it would require squarely facing two very powerful and vocal
sets of interest groups-the American Association of Retired Persons
and other older citizen advocate groups and civil rights organizations
on one side, and the entire business community on the other.
Obviously, it would be much easier for Congress not to amend the
ADEA to adopt disparate impact theory, and with the current
political climate and rather crowded legislative agenda, no amendment
proposal seems likely in the foreseeable future.
Absent any congressional action or amendments to the ADEA,
courts should recognize that disparate impact theory is not currently
applicable under the ADEA. While the goal of attempting to fight
age discrimination is laudable, there is no basis in the statute, its
history or its specific goals for applying the theory. While amending
the ADEA might be appropriate, until such a change is enacted,
disparate impact theory should not be applied to age discrimination
cases brought under the ADEA.
EVAN H. PONTZ
economic effects on businesses.

